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 Abstract 
U.S. farm profitability is near historic highs. This fact raises many questions related to 
the economics of production agriculture. Three questions are examined in this dissertation. First, 
should farmers use a different benchmark for farm profitability? To answer this question, a 
benchmark of farm profitability is developed that adds balance sheet information to an 
established benchmark which uses only income statement data. The second and third questions 
focus on cooperatives since farmers rely on efficient cooperative management to maximize their 
return on investment in the cooperative and their own farm profitability. How should 
cooperatives allocate earnings to farmers? To answer this question, a model is developed to 
inform boards of directors regarding optimal equity allocation decisions. Finally, do cooperatives 
face agency costs? To answer this question, a variable cost model is estimated to examine the 
indirect costs of leverage.  
The first essay used data from Kansas farms to determine the effects of the use of debt on 
cost efficiency. A nonparametric cost efficiency model was used to examine these effects. 
Results indicated that farms which were more specialized, had higher capital costs, and used 
more equity to finance assets experienced larger increases in efficiency when the use of debt was 
included in the analysis. 
The second essay used information on effective tax rates and empirically-estimated risk 
aversion coefficients in a portfolio model to determine the effects of different tax rates on the 
distribution of earnings. Results indicated that even a large deviation in current effective tax rates 
is not likely to affect the optimal share of allocated earnings. However, member risk preferences 
had an economically significant effect on the optimal share of allocated earnings, suggesting that 
board members focus on understanding member risk preferences.  
The third essay used data from U.S. agricultural cooperatives to determine the presence 
of agency costs due to the use of debt. A variable cost function was estimated to generate an 
index of variable cost efficiency which was used to determine the indirect costs of leverage. A 
negative relationship between debt and variable cost efficiency was found, indicating that agency 
costs were present for agricultural cooperatives.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Currently, U.S. net farm income is near historic highs (Figure 1.1). Due in part to 
historically high prices from high demand and favorable policy combined with ever-improving 
technology, the agricultural sector is highly successful. While these “good times” are certainly 
welcome, they raise many interesting questions for farmers and the cooperatives they own. Three 
such questions will be examined in this dissertation. 
Should farmers use a different benchmark for farm profitability? The first essay examines 
issues related to external benchmarks extension services use to provide financial information 
vital for sound business planning. Traditionally, a cost efficiency benchmark that includes 
enterprise outputs, input prices, and input quantities is used to build a frontier of least-cost 
producing farms. Other farms can then be compared to those on the frontier to determine how to 
improve their input or enterprise mixes in order to improve efficiency.  
As useful as this benchmark is, it misses an important part of business planning: the use 
of leverage. Since farms do not typically have access to large equity markets, they rely on debt 
financing as an external funding source for assets. The first essay incorporates measures of 
liquidity and solvency in this benchmark in order to determine the characteristics of farms that 
may benefit from adding this benchmark to its financial analysis toolkit.  
In addition to the use of leverage, farmers invest in agricultural cooperatives to lower the 
cost of inputs, increase revenue from outputs, and gain access at a low cost to fixed investments 
to improve profitability. As with any other profit center, farmers expect a return on their 
investment in cooperatives. In order to provide this return, cooperatives must effectively manage 
the structure of their equity. 
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How should cooperatives allocate earnings to farmers? The second essay examines an 
important issue in cooperative finance. Cooperatives, like farms, do not have access to large 
equity markets and thus depend on debt as an external source of funds. Further, cooperative 
equity is subject to special legal rules and different taxation rules than most corporations. The 
returns from an investment in a cooperative are either taxed at the rate paid by the farmer or at 
the corporate rate. The topic of the second essay is an examination of the effect of taxation on 
cooperative equity. In order to properly understand the role of special legal rules and tax policy 
on cooperatives, a look at the history of the development of the treatment of cooperatives in U.S. 
policy is important. 
 Cooperatives have long enjoyed favorable legislation that enhances their ability to aid 
farmers in supplying their operations, as well as marketing and processing their production. 
Perhaps most significantly is the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922. This act primarily served to 
exempt cooperatives from certain portions of antitrust laws such as the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. The goal of these acts was to prevent private 
monopolies from arising and to limit the ability of producers of goods and services to influence 
prices. 
 Guth (1982) provides an in-depth discussion of the political issues that drove the passage 
of the Capper-Volstead Act. Small, local cooperatives had been quite popular, but it was the 
large dairy cooperatives that had the most political power. This power was concentrated in large 
cities like Chicago and New York. Clashes between opposing interest groups attempting to pass 
legislation in their favor lead to a push for national legislation for cooperatives. Legislators 
questioned whether cooperatives should be exempted from federal antitrust legislation and felt 
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pressure from consumers and processors to reject the legislation. However, influence from 
cooperative proponents like Aaron Sapiro made the case for the advantages of cooperatives.  
In the end, Senator Arthur Capper and Representative Andrew Volstead were key in 
passing the legislation. The bill passed both houses, taking on the “Walsh” amendment which 
clarified that the Act did not allow cooperatives to form monopolies. President Harding signed 
the bill into law in 1922. Guth notes: “Farmer cooperatives were freed from most (if not all) of 
the provisions of the Sherman and Clayton acts; the USDA has sole original jurisdiction over 
violations and would actively (if sympathetically) monitor cooperative behavior; decisions would 
be based on pricing behavior, not market shares; consumers, middlemen, and public officials 
would lodge complaints (especially against the dairymen); and, overall the act opened a greatly 
expanded field for cooperative activity.” 
 Robotka (1959) evaluated the regulatory and legal impacts on the Capper-
Volstead act over the period 1929 – 1959. He notes that while the Capper-Volstead Act 
had been neither challenged nor affirmed in the Supreme Court, its ability stand up to 
scrutiny had improved since the late 1920s. His perspective (which is also consistent with 
Guth’s later analysis) that cooperatives were still subject to most antitrust legislation in 
accordance with the letter of the Capper-Volstead Act. His opinion was that cooperatives 
were being treated fairly according to the law in terms of regulation and litigation. 
 Varney (2010) discusses the modern interpretation of the Capper-Volstead Act. 
The Act “authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to bring administrative action against an 
association that ‘monopolizes or restrains trade … to such an extent that the price of any 
agricultural product is unduly enhanced.’” It has been established that cooperatives are 
not allowed to engage in predatory practices defined under Section 2 of the Sherman 
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Antitrust Act or to collude with other non-cooperative firms. Varney indicates that 
current court cases continue to define the scope of the Act. These definitions include 
recent cases brought against the United Egg Producers Inc., the United Potato Growers of 
America Inc., and United Potato Growers of Idaho Inc. for allegedly limiting their 
production in an attempt to raise prices. Debate exists as to cooperatives’ immunity 
regarding these charges under the Act. 
 In addition to the legal ramifications of Capper-Volstead, there are important 
economic reasons for forming cooperatives. A major advance in the economic theory of 
cooperatives was developed by Edwin G. Nourse. He developed what was termed the 
Competitive Yardstick School. In his 1922 article, Nourse expressed his distaste for 
consumer and labor cooperatives, accusing them of desiring to overthrow the capitalist 
system. His view of agricultural cooperatives differed because he saw in them a genuine 
desire to improve their competitive position within the system. Nourse saw two main 
objectives for the agricultural cooperative: the provision of the means of adopting 
technology that requires a large capital investment and the improvement of bargaining 
power for producer members.  
Both of these objectives really are reflected in the benefits of an agricultural 
cooperative. In Nourse’s view, benefits both the producers and consumers. The producer 
benefits by having the profits that would have gone to downstream firms returned to 
them. The consumer benefits from the increased competition the cooperative provides. 
This is the competitive yardstick function of the agricultural cooperative.  
To achieve this competitive yardstick, Nourse argued that the size of the 
cooperative should match its trading partner. Nourse’s perspective on the scale of the 
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cooperative differed from that of Aaron Sapiro, another pioneer in cooperative theory, in 
that he felt it should match that of its trading partner. That is, the size of the cooperative 
selling a product, like milk, should be of similar size relative to its trading partner, like a 
creamery. 
 Do cooperatives face agency costs? The third essay examines a second issue that affects 
the ability of cooperatives to maximize the return to their members: the management of indirect 
costs related to the use of leverage. As noted above, debt is typically the only source of external 
funds for cooperatives. While leverage can benefit the cooperative by lowering the overall cost 
of financing assets, thereby allowing the firm to take advantage of economies of scale, indirect 
costs from incomplete contracts, illiquid asset markets, or high cash flow risk on the part of the 
borrower may drive up the overall cost of using debt. The third essay examines the impact of the 
use of debt financing on variable cost efficiency.  
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Figure 1.1 Inflation Adjusted U.S. Net Farm Income (USDA) 
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Chapter 2 - The Impact of Liquidity and Solvency on Cost 
Efficiency 
 2.1 Introduction 
Finance and production theory have largely developed separately, as if the economic problems 
associated with them can be easily separated.  However, farmers and other economic decision 
makers in agriculture must integrate these two types of decisions in order to efficiently operate a 
modern agricultural firm or farm.  Liquidity and solvency measures are especially significant 
because debt is used for operating needs and is an important part of farm capital structure and 
farm growth strategies.  Farm operators must make decisions about the usage of debt, that is, 
whether and to what degree the operator will finance short- or long-run inputs with debt.  
 As indicated in the literature, it is important to include analysis of debt to gain an 
understanding of the economic issues farms face.  The issue of credit constraints is particularly 
relevant in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and economic downturn. Briggeman et al. 
(2009), Briggeman & Akers (2010), and Ciaian et al. (2012) found that the availability of and 
access to credit significantly impacts the profitability of farms and rural businesses.  Färe et al. 
(1990) studied the profit of rice farms in California given expenditure constraints on variable 
costs using a linear programming framework.  Even government payments can have an impact 
on farmers’ financing costs.  Kropp & Whitaker (2011) found that decoupled direct payments to 
farmers significantly lower operating costs through lower interest rates.  
While it is clear that liquidity and solvency measures are important in many types of farm 
level analysis, cost efficiency models typically do not include these measures. That is, efficiency 
models tend to only incorporate production-related and input price variables.  To the best of our 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
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knowledge, only one study has incorporated debt and asset constraints into a cost-minimizing 
data envelopment analysis (hereafter, DEA).  Whittaker and Morehart (1991) constructed a best-
practice cost efficiency frontier with financial variables and found that these variables 
significantly impacted cost efficiency estimates.  As a result, a primary contribution of this study 
is to extend the work of Whittaker and Morehart. This will be accomplished by incorporating 
liquidity and solvency measures in a different cost efficiency model and conducting additional 
regression analysis to more fully understand the impact of financial variables on cost efficiency 
scores. 
Of the studies that have examined the impact of liquidity and/or solvency measures on 
cost efficiency models, most have done so after estimating the efficiency models.  Many DEA 
studies are conducted in conjunction with limited dependent models to inform the researcher of 
the relationships between the variables of interest.  For example, Rowland et al. (1998) found 
that the most cost efficient Kansas hog producers tended to have lower debt-to-asset ratios and 
utilized fewer and older buildings and equipment to keep their costs low.  Lambert and Bayda 
(2005) created a set of debt-to-asset ratios based on length of debt terms and asset life and 
examined their impact on technical and scale efficiency scores. For technical efficiency, they 
found that the intermediate-term debt-to-asset ratio had a positive correlation, while the short-
term debt-to-asset ratio had a negative correlation.  Only the intermediate-term ratio was found 
to be significantly related to scale efficiency scores.  More recently, the results from Alarcon 
(2007) suggest that the pressure exerted by financial institutions on farms with higher debt loads 
encourages efficient production behavior.  Specifically, farms which are better able to control 
their costs have more access to credit because they do not present as great a default risk to the 
creditor.   
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
(http://krex.k-state.edu). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
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The purpose of this paper is to construct and utilize a conceptual framework which allows 
the incorporation of debt ratios into the cost efficiency DEA for farm analysis.  The model 
developed is used to determine the impact of liquidity and solvency on cost efficiency and to 
determine farm characteristics that drive the impacts debt ratios have on cost efficiency.  The 
present work adds to the literature by directly incorporating debt ratios into the estimation of cost 
efficiency and through the use of a Tobit regression analysis to determine the characteristics of 
farms more likely to experience an improvement in efficiency with the inclusion of debt ratios.  
This work differs from that of Whittaker and Morehart (1991) in that it uses a different DEA 
framework and expands the analysis by using Tobit regressions.  To illustrate these findings, a 
sample of Kansas farms are utilized to show that farms that are deemed inefficient with standard 
DEA models are actually efficient when incorporating liquidity and solvency ratios. 
 2.2 Methods 
This study is conducted in two stages.  The first stage uses two DEA models to examine 
the cost efficiency of 303 farms in Kansas.  The first model is a standard or base DEA model and 
the second model builds on the base model by including financial or debt variables.  The second 
stage uses Tobit regressions to determine the impact of cost ratios and income shares on the 
degree to which efficiency improves due to the addition of liquidity and solvency. 
In the first stage, the debt ratios are added in a manner consistent with Coelli et al. 
(2005).  That is, the debt ratios are added as undesirable outputs in the DEA program.  Coelli et 
al. (2005) indicate that the auxiliary regression approach can also be used to examine efficiency 
differences related to variables such as financial ratios (e.g., Alarcon (2007), Lambert and Bayda 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
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(2005), and Rowland et al. (1998)).  Adding debt ratios to the DEA model, allows us to more 
precisely measure how the financial variables move or rotate the frontier1.  
It is not clear if adding the debt ratios will improve cost efficiency.  Optimal capital 
structure of a firm states that the cost of equity is greater than the cost of debt.  So, farms could 
use debt, a lower cost of capital, in a manner that improves their cost efficiency.  Furthermore, 
paying interest on debt can lower tax burdens for farms, which would also lower cost structures 
for farms.  However, if a farm adds too much debt and elevates their default risk, a lender will 
respond by raising debt interest rates, which will raise the cost of capital and hinder a farm’s cost 
efficiency.   
Agency costs may also impact the relationship between efficiency and debt in farms.  
These costs arise from a lack of information as to the potential performance of the farm.  In order 
to account for these costs, lenders modify the terms of debt agreements by increasing the interest 
rate.  A farmer may, in order to obtain additional debt financing, be required to pay higher 
interest rates if his or her operation presents a higher default risk due to an elevated solvency 
ratio.   
 To test the impact of debt ratios on cost efficiency, two constant returns to scale DEA 
models are utilized that follow Färe et al. (1985).  To our knowledge, we are the first to add 
liquidity and solvency ratios to this efficiency model for the analysis of farms.  The base model 
is a standard cost efficiency model that includes five inputs and two outputs. The debt model is 
similar to the base model, but includes the inverse current ratio (the current ratio is inverted to 
avoid the problem of division by zero in the case of a farm with no current liabilities) and the 
                                                 
1 Caution should be exercised when examining the change in efficiency that occurs when financial ratios are added 
to the DEA model.  In general, adding variables to a DEA model will result in a change in efficiency. 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
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total debt-to-asset ratio as outputs.  As discussed above, this inclusion of financial ratios is akin 
to the inclusion of “environmental” variables by Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and Coelli et al. 
(2005).   
The first DEA model is the base model and is developed as follows: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛  𝑤𝑖′𝑥𝑖∗          (1) 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜  𝑧𝑖 𝑥𝑖  ≤ 𝑥𝑘∗        (2) 
   𝑧𝑖 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑦𝑘       (3) 
where 𝑤 is a vector of input prices, 𝑥∗ is a vector of inputs that minimizes farm 𝑖’s cost, 𝑥 is a 
vector of actual inputs, 𝑧 measures the weighting of each farm in forming the frontier, and 𝑦 is a 
vector of outputs.  Furthermore, it is assumed that  𝑤 is strictly positive and 𝑧, 𝑥, and 𝑦  are 
greater than or equal to zero.  Equation 1 is the objective function, which assumes that each farm 
will minimize total cost and operates under constant returns to scale.  Equation 2 compares the 
input of each farm to the rest of the farms and equation 3 compares the output of each farm to the 
rest of the farms.  Equations 2 and 3 form the best-practice cost-efficiency frontier for the base 
DEA or the model that does not incorporate financial variables. 
 The primary contribution of this paper is the addition of financial measures, liquidity and 
solvency, to the cost efficiency model developed by Färe et al. (1985).  This addition accounts 
for the ability of farmers to control their debt exposure.  The debt model includes equations 1 
through 3 and adds the following liquidity and solvency constraints: 
𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑖 ≤ 𝑙𝑘           (4) 
𝑧𝑖𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝑠𝑘           (5)  
where 𝑙 is the inverse current ratio and 𝑠 is the negative of the debt-to-asset ratio.  Both variables 
are assumed to be less than or equal to zero.  The inequality constraint indicates that the addition 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
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elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
  13  
 
of debt is undesirable ceteris paribus.  The intuition of equations 4 and 5 is that if a farm incurs 
costs to produce more output, but subsequently takes on a larger amount of short- or long-term 
debt relative to its asset size, the farm may incur higher costs (e.g., interest rate increases) 
because of added financial risk. Equations 2 through 5 form the best-practice cost-efficiency 
frontier for the debt DEA or the model that does incorporate financial variables.  
To identify how cost efficient the ith farm is, two cost efficiency scores are calculated for 
each farm using the jth DEA base and debt models. Cost efficiency scores are: 
𝐶𝐸𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖′𝑥𝑖∗/𝑤𝑖′𝑥𝑖        (6) 
where 𝐶𝐸 is the cost efficiency score and is defined as the ratio of the minimum cost under 
constant returns to scale to actual cost.  𝐶𝐸 is strictly positive.  A farm is considered efficient if 
the cost efficiency score is equal to one.  That is, if a farm’s actual cost is equal to the theoretical 
minimum cost as defined by model j, the farm is on the frontier. 
The objective of the second stage is to determine which farm characteristics have a 
statistically significant impact on the improvement in cost efficiency from the addition of 
financial ratios to the DEA models.  The primary reason for using a Tobit regression rather than 
simply analyzing the mean values of farm characteristics is that the regression approach accounts 
for the covariance among the cost ratios and among the income shares when estimating the 
increase in efficiency.  A failure to account for the covariance among the shares may lead to 
erroneous conclusions, such as an attribution of an improvement in efficiency to one factor when 
it is actually due to another.  The dependent variable (Λ) in the Tobit regression is specified as 
follows: 
Λ =  𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝐶𝐸𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒        (7) 
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where Λ  is equal to the difference between the cost efficiency scores.  Thus, the Tobit regression 
analysis will help determine what specific farm characteristics drive cost efficiencies. It is 
important to note that none of the cost efficiency scores in the debt model were lower than those 
in the base model for any of the farms. 
The first Tobit regression analyzes the impact of cost shares on the degree to which cost 
efficiency will increase with the addition of financial ratios to the DEA model.  The cost shares 
are computed by dividing a given input cost by total input cost.  To avoid the problem of 
singularity, the cost shares are normalized by the largest cost, total capital costs.  The resulting 
Tobit model is as follows: 
Λ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐾 )𝑖 + 𝛽2 (𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐾 )𝑖 + 𝛽3 (𝐿𝑉𝑆𝐾𝐾 )𝑖 + 𝛽4 (𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝐾 )𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖                               (8) 
where (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅
𝐾
) is the ratio of farm labor cost to capital cost, (𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑃
𝐾
) is the crop input (i.e., 
allocable crop inputs such as fertilizer) to capital ratio, (𝐿𝑉𝑆𝐾
𝐾
) is the livestock input (i.e., 
allocable livestock inputs such as feed) to capital ratio, (𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿
𝐾
) is fuel to capital ratio, and 𝑒 is the  
error term.     
 The second Tobit regression analyzes the impact of income shares on the degree to which 
cost efficiency will increase when financial ratios are added to the DEA model.  Income shares 
are calculated by dividing the revenue of a given enterprise by gross farm income.  This Tobit 
model is: 
Λ = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐹𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑁𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐻𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿4𝑊𝐻𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿5𝐵𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿6𝐷𝑌𝑖 + 𝛿7𝑆𝑊𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖               (9) 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑁 is the share of total income from feed grain enterprises, 𝐻𝐹 is the share of total 
income from hay and forage enterprises, 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑆𝐷 is the share of total income from oil seed 
enterprises, 𝑊𝐻𝐸𝐴𝑇 is the share of total income coming from the wheat enterprise, 𝐵𝐹 is the 
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share of total income from beef cattle enterprises, 𝐷𝑌 is the share of total income from dairy 
enterprises, 𝑆𝑊 is the share of total income from swine enterprises, and 𝜀 is the error term.  Note 
that government payments, crop insurance proceeds, and other miscellaneous income are omitted 
from equation (9) above to avoid singularity.  These items are included in the DEA estimation. 
 The third Tobit regression analyzes the impact of operator age, farm size, specialization, 
and farm type on the degree to which cost efficiency will increase when financial ratios are 
added to the DEA model.   
This Tobit model is: 
Λ = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜑1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖2 + 𝛾2𝐺𝐹𝐼𝑖 + 𝜑2𝐺𝐹𝐼𝑖2 + 𝛾3𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝜁𝑖                                        (10) 
where 𝐴𝐺𝐸 is the age of the operator; 𝐺𝐹𝐼 is the gross income of the farm; 𝐻𝐻𝐼 is the Herfindahl 
index of specialization; 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 is the percentage of labor devoted to crop production, a proxy for 
farm type; and 𝜁 is the error term.  Four iterations of this model were estimated.  The first was 
estimated with 𝜑1,𝜑2, and 𝛾4 set equal to zero; the second was estimated with 𝜑1and 𝜑2 set 
equal to zero; the third was estimated with 𝛾4 set equal to zero; and the fourth estimated all 
coefficients.    
 Since the cost efficiency scores are not independent of each other, the error terms in the 
Tobit regressions are not independently and identically distributed.  In order to account for this, 
the standard errors in these regressions were calculated using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 
replications. 
 2.3 Data 
Data were obtained from the Kansas Farm Management Association or KFMA (Langemeier, 
2010).  KFMA data is unique because it provides a level of disaggregation not readily available 
in other farm datasets, which is necessary to examine the relationship between production and 
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financial variables. Using one year of data to estimate cost efficiency scores is problematic due 
to weather variability.  Therefore, the variable averages for each of the 303 farms with 
continuous data from 2006 to 2010 are used in the analysis. 
Summary statistics for the inputs, outputs, financial ratios, cost shares, and income shares 
are presented in Table 1.1.  Crop inputs consist of seed, fertilizer, herbicide and insecticide, crop 
marketing and storage, and crop insurance.  The livestock input consists of purchased feed, dairy 
expense, veterinarian expense, and livestock marketing and breeding.  Fuel is comprised of fuel, 
auto expense, irrigation energy, and utilities.  Labor is represented by the number of workers 
(hired workers, and unpaid family and operator workers).  The capital input includes repairs; 
machine hire; general farm insurance; property taxes; organization fees, publications, and travel 
expenses; conservation expense; interest; cash farm rent; and an interest charge on net worth 
(Langemeier 2010).  Labor price is obtained by dividing labor cost by the number of workers.  
Implicit input quantities for the crop input, livestock input, fuel, and capital are computed by 
dividing the respective input costs by USDA input price indices.   
Outputs include crop and livestock.  Implicit crop and livestock quantities are computed 
by dividing crop income and livestock income by Kansas crop price and livestock price indices 
created using price indices from USDA-NASS.  The primary sources of crop income are feed 
grains (e.g., corn and grain sorghum), hay and forages, oilseeds (e.g., soybeans and sunflowers), 
wheat, government payments, and crop insurance proceeds while the primary sources of 
livestock income are beef, dairy, and swine production.   
 2.4 Results 
The results offer insights into the relationships between farm characteristics and cost efficiency 
when debt ratios are considered.  The first stage results of the analysis are found in Table 2.2.  In 
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the base DEA model, four farms are efficient (i.e., they lie on the frontier, mathematically: 
𝐶𝐸 = 1), while nineteen are efficient in the debt DEA model.  This increase in the number of 
farms on the best-practice frontier implies that some farms are better at managing cost when 
financing decisions are considered in the analysis.  It is worth noting that the four efficient farms 
in the base model are also efficient in the debt model.  Given that there are so few efficient 
farms, it is difficult to discuss the statistical significance of the differences between farm 
characteristics of the efficient farms for the base and debt models. 
Cost efficiency levels improve when debt is included in the DEA model.  The average 
efficiency score in the base model is 65.67% while the average for the debt model is 70.45%.  A 
paired t-test shows that these means are significantly different.  According to the base model, the 
average farm could reduce its costs by 34.33% and maintain its current output if it was cost 
efficient.  For the debt model, the average farm need only reduce its costs by 29.55% in order to 
be efficient. These results are consistent with those found in the Whittaker and Morehart (1991) 
study. 
Our findings assume that farms manage their debt effectively.  Twenty-nine percent of 
the farms have improved efficiency scores in the debt model vis-à-vis the base model.  Our 
results confirm that not accounting for financial variables seriously underestimates a farm’s cost 
efficiency.  These results suggest to producers that adequate time should be spent managing their 
use of debt and that simply focusing on the production aspects of the business can result in 
reduced cost efficiency.   
To better understand the improvements in efficiency scores, the improvements in 
efficiency were broken down into quartiles based on the cost efficiency score in the base model.  
An analysis of these quartiles for the base and debt models is shown in Table 2.3.  An 
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improvement is defined as the difference between the efficiency score in the debt model and the 
efficiency score in the base model.  The base model efficiency scores are divided into quartiles 
with quartile 1 being the top 25% of farms.  Efficiency and improvement are negatively 
correlated; that is, more of the farms in the lower efficiency quartiles have an improvement in 
efficiency and vice versa.  Further, larger average improvements are realized for the lower 
efficiency farms.  In contrast to Rowland et al. (1998), our analysis shows that farms with higher 
cost efficiency were less liquid and and more solvent.  This result is consistent with Alarcon 
(2007) and Lambert and Bayda (2005).     
 Paired t-tests are used to determine the differences in key farm characteristics between 
farms that did and did not incur an improvement in cost efficiency when financial ratios were 
added.  These paired t-tests are shown in Table 2.4.  The largest improvement in cost efficiency 
across cost shares is found in farms that have significantly lower crop and fuel inputs and 
significantly higher capital input. Additionally, the results of paired t-tests show that adding 
financial variables to the DEA model really improve the cost efficiencies for livestock 
operations. That is, farms with an improved efficiency score had significantly lower feed grain 
income share, higher beef income share as well as a smaller percentage of their time devoted to 
crop production.  Farms with an improved cost efficiency score had older operators and were 
more specialized.  Furthermore, farms with an improved cost efficiency score had higher 
liquidity and lower debt levels. 
The results of the Tobit regressions bring to light some important results related to capital 
costs and debt usage.  In Table 2.5, the crop/capital and livestock/capital ratios are statistically 
significant and negatively related to the difference in base and debt DEA model cost efficiency 
scores.  That is, farms with higher crop/capital and livestock/capital ratios tend to have lower 
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improvements in efficiency when liquidity and solvency ratios are added to the cost efficiency 
estimation.  This key finding is supported by the results in Table 2.4.  Recall that farms that 
improved their efficiency had significantly larger capital costs and significantly higher liquidity 
and lower solvency ratios.  These findings imply agency costs may be restricting the usage of 
debt and driving up capital costs due to increased default risk.  Farms that improved cost 
efficiency with the addition of financial ratios to the base model had higher capital costs because 
they held more equity.   
None of the marginal effects on the income share were statistically significant in the 
income share regression. Table 2.6 presents the results of this regression.  This result implies that 
the choice of enterprise does not significantly impact the probability of an improvement in 
efficiency due to debt use planning.  
Additional regression analysis was conducted to determine the impact of age, size, 
specialization, and operation type (livestock or crop farm) on the degree of improvement in 
efficiency.  Results of these regressions are found in Table 2.7.   
Assuming a linear relationship between the right-hand side variables and improvement in 
efficiency, we find that age and specialization are significant and positively related to 
improvement in efficiency.  When square terms are added for the age of operator and farm size 
variables, only specialization is significantly correlated to improvement in efficiency. 
 2.5 Conclusions and Implications 
This paper provided a conceptual framework that can be used to examine the impact of 
liquidity and solvency on cost efficiency.  This framework was then applied to a sample of 
Kansas farms.  The results of this paper confirmed the importance of including liquidity and 
solvency measures when estimating cost efficiency.  Specifically, the results indicated that 
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including liquidity and solvency ratios in DEA models had a statistically significant impact on 
improving cost efficiency for some farms.   
 Adding liquidity and solvency ratios to the DEA analysis improved efficiency scores, 
especially for low efficiency farms.  Less efficient farms, as defined by the lowest quartile cost 
efficiency estimates, saw significant improvements in their efficiency scores when financial 
ratios were added.  Thus, an analyst may be missing an important part of a given farm’s 
efficiency picture unless debt measures are included in the cost efficiency estimation.    
 Furthermore, adding liquidity and solvency ratios to the cost efficiency estimation 
improved efficiency values for farms with different input mixes.  When adding financial ratios to 
cost share analysis, farms with lower crop and fuel input levels and a higher capital input level 
had a higher efficiency gain than the average farm when liquidity and solvency ratios were 
added.  
A key finding of this paper is that farms that improved their cost efficiency had higher 
capital costs, higher liquidity ratios, and lower solvency ratios.  This finding is confirmed by the 
Tobit regression results which showed that a farm was less likely to improve if it spent a larger 
share of its total cost on purchased inputs relative to capital.  The combination of these results 
suggests that farms that improve their efficiency with the addition of financial ratios have more 
equity.  Given the KFMA data does not ask debt or credit usage questions, it is not possible to 
surmise why these farmers choose to provide more self-financing rather than financing from a 
lender. 
 Although income shares were not significantly related to improvements in cost 
efficiency, we found a significant and positive relationship between specialization and 
improvements in efficiency.  This indicates that while enterprise choice does not impact cost 
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efficiency when debt ratios are added to the model, the choice of the number of enterprises to 
operate does.  There is also evidence that the age of operator is significantly related to 
improvement in efficiency.  Results suggest that the efficiency indices for older operators are 
impacted to a greater extent by the addition of debt ratios than those for younger operators. 
More work is needed to fully understand the finance and production decisions of the farm 
operation.  Often, farm efficiency analyses focus on production and ignore the financial 
decisions (e.g., Yeager and Langemeier, 2009).  However, the present study illustrated that 
adding debt ratios improves cost efficiency scores. 
In sum, the results of this paper suggest that past benchmark performance measures 
underestimated efficiency.  We suggest that financial ratios be included in cost efficiency 
benchmarks in order to account for the possibility of credit constraints.  Further, we have 
demonstrated that the impact of an inclusion of financial ratios in the cost efficiency estimation 
varies according to the particular distribution of cost shares and other farm characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
(http://krex.k-state.edu). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
  22  
 
 2.6 References 
Alarcon, S.  2007. “Debt Financing and Efficiency in Agricultural Firms.” Presented at the 
Mediterranean Conference of Agro-Food Social Scientists. 103rd EAAE Seminar ‘Adding 
Value to the Agro-Food Supply Chain in the Future of Euromediterranean Space’. 
Barcelona, Spain, April 23 – 25, 2007. 
 
Briggeman, B.C., C.A. Towe, and M.J. Morehart. 2009. “Credit Constraints: Their Existence, 
Determinants, and Implications for U.S. Farm and Non-Farm Sole Proprietorships.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 91(1):275-289.  
 
Briggeman, B.C. and M.M. Akers. 2010. “The Credit Advantage of Farm and Rural Small 
Business Ownership.” Agricultural Finance Review. (70)3:353-364. 
 
Ciaian, P., J. Falkowski, and D. Kancs. 2012. “Access to Credit, Factor Allocation, and Farm 
Productivity: Evidence from the CEE Transition Economies.” Agricultural Finance 
Review. (72)1:22-47. 
 
Coelli, T.J., D.S.P. Rao, C.J. O’Donnell, and G.E. Battese. 2005. An Introduction to Efficiency 
and Productivity Analysis, Second Edition. New York, Springer. 
 
Färe, R., S. Grosskopf, and C.A.K. Lovell. 1985. The Measurement of Efficiency of  
 Production. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff. 
 
Färe, R., S. Grosskopf, and H. Lee. 1990. “A Nonparametric Approach to  
Expenditure-Constrained Profit Maximization.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 72(3):574-581. 
 
Ferrier, G.D. and C.A.K. Lovell. 1990. “Measuring Cost Efficiency in Banking.” Journal of 
Econometrics. 46:229-245. 
 
Kropp, J.D. and J.B. Whitaker. 2011. “The Impact of Decoupled Payments on the Cost of 
Operating Capital.” Agricultural Finance Review. 71(1):25-40. 
 
Lambert, D.K. and V.V. Bayda. 2005. “The Impacts of Farm Financial Structure 
on Production Efficiency.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics.  
37(1):277-289. 
 
Langemeier, M.R. 2010.  Kansas Farm Management SAS Data Bank Documentation.  Staff 
Paper No. 11-01, Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University. 
 
Rowland, W.W., M.R. Langemeier, B.W. Schurle, and A.M. Featherstone.  1998. "A 
Nonparametric Efficiency Analysis For A Sample Of Kansas Swine Operations." 
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 30(1):189-199. 
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
(http://krex.k-state.edu). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
  23  
 
Whittaker, G.W. and M.J. Morehart. 1991. “Measuring the Effect of Farm Financial Structure on
 Cost Efficiency.” Agricultural Finance Review. 51:95-105. 
 
Yeager, E. and M. Langemeier.  2009.  “Measuring Sustained Competitive Advantage for a 
Sample of Kansas Farms.”  Journal of the American Society of Farm Managers and 
Rural Appraisers.  72:112-123. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
(http://krex.k-state.edu). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
  24  
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for a Sample of 303 Kansas Farms from 2003 to 2010. 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Inputs 
  
    Crop* 103,561 111,317 
    Livestock * 38,858 254,567 
    Fuel* 21,221 16,485 
    Labor** 1.181 0.573 
    Capital* 175,367 128,581 
Outputs 
  
    Livestock* 72,554 211,626 
    Crop* 267,509 299,502 
Cost Shares 
  
    Crop 0.22 0.103 
    Livestock 0.057 0.069 
    Fuel  0.069 0.022 
    Labor 0.176 0.07 
    Capital 0.478 0.09 
Income Shares*** 
  
    Feed Grain (e.g., corn and grains sorghum) 0.177 0.137 
    Hay and Forage 0.035 0.057 
    Oilseed (e.g., soybeans and sunflowers) 0.205 0.154 
    Wheat 0.159 0.145 
    Beef 0.277 0.23 
    Dairy 0.002 0.02 
    Swine 0.001 0.009 
Other 
  
    Inverse Current Ratio (Current Liabilities/Current Assets) 0.289 0.308 
    Total Debt/Asset Ratio 0.269 0.227 
    Herfindahl Index of Specialization 0.300 0.139 
    Age of Operator 56.676 10.864 
    Gross Income $352,807  $402,038  
    Percentage of Labor for Crop Production 0.706 0.175 
*Units are implicit quantity. 
**Unit is number of workers. 
  ***Government payments and crop insurance are omitted. 
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Table 2.2 Summary Results of the Data Envelopment Analyses. 
   
DEA Model Cost Efficiency Score = 1 
Mean Efficiency 
Score 
 
Base Model 4 65.67% 
  Debt Model 19 70.45% 
          *The efficiency score is the ratio of minimum cost found in the DEA model to actual cost. 
Notes: Total number of farms = 303 
           Twenty-nine percent of farms had higher efficiency in the debt model than in the base model. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Analysis of Cost Efficiency Quartiles. 
 
Efficiency Number of Farms Average Improvement Mean Financial Ratios 
Quartile* Improved** in Cost Efficiency*** Liquidity1 Solvency2 
1 13 1.38% 0.3307 0.3429 
2 20 2.69% 0.2825 0.2808 
3 25 6.00% 0.2406 0.2378 
4 32 8.93% 0.2431 0.1715 
     *The 25% of farms with highest cost efficiency make up the first quartile. 
 **Number of farms which had higher efficiency in the Debt model than in the Base model. 
***Average improvement in cost efficiency between the Debt and Base DEA models. 
1Inverse Current Ratio 
2Total Debt/Asset Ratio 
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Table 2.4 Comparison of Mean Values of Farm Characteristics† 
 
  
No Improvement 
in 
Improvement 
in Difference 
  
Efficiency Efficiency 
Cost Shares Labor 0.175 0.178 0.003 
 
Crop 0.242 0.186 0.056*** 
 
Fuel 0.07 0.062 0.007*** 
 
Livestock 0.06 0.05 0.011 
 
Capital 0.453 0.524 0.071*** 
Income Shares Feed Grain 0.211 0.174 0.038** 
 
Hay/Forage 0.04 0.033 0.007 
 
Oilseed 0.219 0.213 0.006 
 
Wheat 0.161 0.139 0.022 
 
Beef 0.234 0.318 0.084*** 
 
Dairy 0 0 0 
 
Swine 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Other Gross Income $367,609  $317,775  $49,833  
Characteristics Crop Labor 0.72 0.673 0.047** 
 
Workers 1.183 1.237 0.054 
 
Herfindahl Index of 
Specialization 0.289 0.328 0.039** 
 
Age of Operator 54.62 61.492 6.872*** 
 
Liquidity1 0.371 0.045 0.326*** 
 Solvency2 0.33 0.086 0.244*** 
     †Comparison between farms which experienced an improvement in efficiency when financial ratios 
were added to the DEA with those that did not. 
*Significant at the 90% confidence level. 
  **Significant at the 95% confidence level. 
  ***Significant at the 99% confidence level.  
1Inverse Current Ratio 
2Total Debt/Asset Ratio 
  
Note: Results based on paired t-tests. 
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Table 2.5 Cost Share Tobit Regression Results† 
 
Marginal 
Effects 
P-Values 
Labor/Capital -0.147 0.121 
Crop/Capital -0.45*** 0.000 
Livestock/Capital -0.389** 0.018 
Fuel/Capital -0.597 0.102 
   *Significant at the 90% level. 
  **Significant at the 95% level. 
  ***Significant at the 99% level. 
  †Dependent variable is equal to the difference between the efficiency score in the debt DEA 
model and the efficiency score in the base DEA model. 
Notes:  
Labor is hired and unpaid farm labor, crop is primarily seed and fertilizer, livestock is 
primarily feed, and capital is primarily interest expense and depreciation. 
Standard errors were calculated using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications. 
  
 
 
Table 2.6 Income Share Tobit Regression Results† 
 
Marginal 
Effects P-Values 
Feed Grain (e.g., corn and grain sorghum) -0.145 0.550 
Hay and Forage -0.520 0.289 
Oilseeds (e.g., soybeans and sunflowers) 0.130 0.593 
Wheat -0.072 0.781 
Beef 0.324 0.101 
Dairy -8.345 0.991 
Swine -0.271 0.999 
   † Dependent variable is equal to the difference between the efficiency score in the 
debt DEA model and the efficiency score in the base DEA model. 
Note: Standard errors were calculated using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 
replications. 
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Table 2.7 Age, Size, Specialization, and Farm Type Tobit Regression Results† 
 
Marginal 
Effects 
P-
Values 
Marginal 
Effects 
P-
Values 
Marginal 
Effects 
P-
Values 
Marginal 
Effects 
P-
Values 
Age 0.00787*** 0.000 0.00777*** 0.000 0.0013735 0.909 0.0003847 0.974 
Age Squared 
    
0.0000554 0.589 6.35E-05 0.533 
Gross Farm Income -3.90E-06 0.520 -2.60E-05 0.667 -4.13E-05 0.626 -3.53E-06 0.969 
Gross Farm Income Squared 
    
1.24E-09 0.953 -5.50E-09 0.802 
Herfindahl Index of 
Specialization 0.354*** 0.003 0.268** 0.044 0.3516*** 0.001 0.2627* 0.036 
Crop Labor 
  
-0.133 0.220 
 
0.151 -0.1447 0.211 
         †Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the debt DEA showed a higher efficiency for a given farm than for the base model and 
is equal to 0 if the efficiency scores are the same for the two models. 
*Significant at the 90% level. 
**Significant at the 95% level. 
***Significant at the 99% level. 
Notes: 
Age is the average Age of the operator over the study period. 
Standard errors were calculated using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications. 
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Chapter 3 - Cooperative Equity Allocation: A Portfolio Approach 
 3.1 Introduction 
A key issue for cooperatives is the management of the distribution of the firm’s earnings. 
Since the maximization of the return to the member is the primary goal of the cooperative 
(VanSickle and Ladd, 1983; Sexton, 1986), board members and managers should use tools and 
information at their disposal to choose the optimal level of retained earnings and earnings 
allocated to members. 
The decision to retain or allocate funds to members involves balancing member 
preferences for fixed assets provided by the cooperative and cash returns on their investment in 
the cooperative. Cooperatives must retain sufficient earnings to replace depreciated assets and 
invest in expansion of the firm. Expansion allows the cooperative to take advantage of 
economies of scale, a key part of the purpose of its establishment according to the Competitive 
Yardstick theory. Allocation of earnings to members is also crucial as members will likely prefer 
to have a portion of their investment paid out to them to invest in their own operations. This 
comports with the view that cooperatives raise (lower) the net price received (paid) for the 
members’ product (inputs).  
Tax rates, to the extent that they have a differential effect on the value of retained and 
allocated earnings, may also affect the board’s decision to allocate or retain earnings. A higher 
tax rate paid on allocated (retained) earnings reduces the return to the member from allocated 
(retained) earnings and thus may influence the board to retain (allocate) a larger share of the 
earnings of the cooperative.  
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Member risk preferences can influence the board’s decision to allocate equity to the 
extent that returns from retained earnings and allocated earnings are characterized by different 
risk-return tradeoffs. If returns from allocated (retained) earnings become more risky, ceteris 
paribus, members will prefer a higher percentage of earnings be retained (allocated). The degree 
to which this effect influences the optimal decision of the board depends on the strength of the 
members’ preference for lower risk. If members are more risk averse, this effect will be stronger 
than if members were more risk neutral.  
This study has two primary objectives. First, we develop a mean-variance portfolio model 
that explicitly accounts for the effects of income tax rates and member risk preferences on the 
allocation of equity. Second, we use sensitivity analyses to examine the effects of different tax 
regimes and farmer risk-preferences on the optimal allocation of cooperative equity.  
To understand the problems faced by the board when deciding how much of earnings 
should be allocated to the membership or retained in the cooperative, it is necessary to 
understand the sources and possible allocations the board faces. Figure 3.1 provides a diagram of 
the foregoing discussion.   
Cooperative profits come from two possible sources. Members can buy/sell 
inputs/outputs with the cooperative; this is called patronage income. Non-patronage income 
primarily comes from nonmembers and/or investments the cooperative has made in federated 
cooperatives and other ventures. Both patronage and non-patronage profits are split into two 
categories: allocated and unallocated. An intuitive way to think of this distinction is that 
allocated earnings are “earmarked” for the member, whereas unallocated equity is not. Also, 
allocated earnings can be paid in cash, cash patronage refund, or held as equity in the 
cooperative, retained patronage refund. There are multiple strategies of returning retained 
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patronage refunds or allocated equity to the members (Dahl and Dobson, 1976), but it must be 
paid to the member in the event of death. Unallocated equity is only paid to the members in the 
cases of liquidation of the firm.  
Though profits from patronage business can be put into retained earnings, this practice is 
sometimes controversial as it conflicts with traditional cooperative principles (Kenkel, 2012). 
This is because members want their equity to be returned to them on the cooperative’s revolving 
schedule or upon death. Unallocated equity stays in the firm unless it is liquidated.  
Note that the diagram focuses on non-section 521 cooperatives. The reason is that most 
farmer cooperatives operate as non-section 521. Furthermore, section 521 cooperatives can 
allocate non-patronage earnings to its members however doing so can lead to legal issues. 
Namely, allocating non-patronage earnings to members under section 521 code means all non-
members must be treated similarly as members. 
Taxation of cooperatives is different from taxation of investor-owned firms (Figure 3.1). 
Members pay taxes on “qualified” earnings, whether the member receives them as cash 
patronage refunds or earnings allocated to them and held on the cooperative’s balance sheet. 
Cooperatives pay federal taxes according to the C corporation tables on all non-qualified 
earnings as well as any earnings from non-member sources. To manage the effects of taxation on 
member returns, the board must be conscious of the effective tax rates of their members and of 
the cooperative itself. This is a key part of effective management of a cooperative’s equity. 
Another responsibility of the cooperative board is to align business practices with the risk 
preferences of members. Particularly important in this regard is the members’ investment of 
equity in the cooperative. Cooperative net worth has grown rapidly in recent years. Total U.S. 
cooperative net worth grew from $20.57 billion in 2006 to $31.3 billion in 2011, an average 
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yearly increase of 9% (USDA). This increase is amplified by the decline in the number of 
cooperatives from 2,675 in 2006 to 2,285 in 2011, an average yearly decrease of 3% per year. 
Taken together, the average cooperative’s net worth has increased from $7.45 million in 2006 to 
$12.21 million in 2011. Given these increases in member investment, and the associated increase 
responsibility of the board to manage this equity in accordance with member preferences, the 
present study will examine the effect of member risk preferences on the allocation of equity. 
 3.2 Literature Review 
 This section discusses the relevant research regarding cooperative finance issues. It is 
divided into 4 subsections: performance and productivity of cooperatives, general capital issues, 
debt-specific issues, and equity revolvement and patronage refund policies.  
 3.2.1 Capital Issues 
Capital issues are important to cooperatives because of the unique challenges they face in 
regard to raising equity. Adding further complications is the “one member, one vote” regime. 
Large producers, who conduct a significant amount of patronage business and therefore generate 
a lot of equity for the cooperative, may be disenfranchised from using cooperatives because the 
“one member, one vote” limits their ability to control the firm. The reason is because a 
producer’s control is not tied to their investment or patronage with the firm. Further, because of 
their mission to serve members, attracting nonmember investment is difficult because the returns 
are typically low compared to a potential investor’s opportunity cost on the stock market.  
 Chaddad, Cook, and Heckelei (2005) determine whether physical capital investment is 
constrained by availability of finance for cooperatives. Findings suggest that cash flow and the 
marginal profitability of capital are positively related to investment. Size, credit risk, and 
leverage significantly impact capital investment which implies that managers can alleviate 
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capital constraints by pursuing a growth strategy while maintaining a conservative capital 
structure (that is, holding less debt as a percentage of total assets).  
Further, investment constraints are brought about by free rider, horizon, and portfolio 
problems. A major problem is that cooperatives distribute benefits according to patronage rather 
than equity holdings and do not allow transfer of benefits. The authors suggest that these 
restrictions on residual claims should be re-evaluated to ensure profitability. 
Parcell, Featherstone, and Barton (1998) use an expected utility model to determine the 
optimal financial leverage of a cooperative. Sensitivity analyses were conducted using a 
stochastic interest rate and a range of risk-aversion levels. The authors found that using more 
equity reduced the probability of loss but sacrificed profitability. Strategies that can reduce the 
probability of loss and increase profitability include increasing return on local assets, using debt 
financing with a low interest rate, and reducing business or financial risk. The study concludes 
that a decrease in the ratio of equity to assets from 68.7% to 51.8%  would increase the 
probability of the return on equity falling below 0% from 9.09% to 14.29% in Midwestern 
agricultural cooperatives.  
Barton et al (2011) summarized the results of a survey of cooperative leaders which was 
intended to determine issues cooperatives face in financing their operations. The survey 
indicated that “financing and managing the asset growth needed to meet member needs and 
keeping equity proportional to usage” are critical issues for cooperative managers.  
 3.2.2 Patronage Refunds and Equity Revolvement  
Part of the unique structure of cooperatives is their responsibility to return the patronage 
of their members. Additionally, the equity retained in the firm must be returned to the members 
in some fashion. These responsibilities typically fall on the board of directors that may or may 
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not be equipped to determine the best patronage refund and equity revolvement policies. This has 
lead economists to consider patronage refunds and equity revolvement at length. This section 
will discuss the literature related to these topics. 
VanSickle and Ladd (1983), using a maximization of after-tax member benefits 
approach, find that cooperatives should pay roughly 70% of their patronage refunds to members 
in cash. The legal minimum cash patronage refund is 20%. Further, cooperatives should pay the 
maximum allowable dividend on common stock if one is paid. Analysis of the leverage ratio 
(ratio of total debt to total assets) yields optimum values between 0.39 and 0.69. 
Dahl and Dobson (1976) use data from Wisconsin farm supply cooperatives and a cost 
minimization model to determine the least-cost financial structure. The results suggest that 
cooperatives should use less capital from retained patronage funds and more from permanent 
equity (such as preferred and common stock). Using less retained patronage to finance the 
business indicates that cash patronage refunds could increase. This increase would most likely be 
attractive to members because it would lower the net price paid on inputs.  
Dahl and Dobson suggest a dynamic strategy for financial restructuring. The cooperative 
should take on more long-term debt and subsequently issue more common stock (that would 
need to be purchased by members). The benefit to the member of adding more common stock to 
their portfolio would be attractive dividends and the long-term competitiveness of the 
cooperative.  
 Royer and Shihipar (1997) used a present value framework to determine the optimal rate 
of cash patronage refunds based on member age. Based on collective choice analysis using a 
median voter rule, cooperatives will most likely pay the 20% minimum cash patronage refund 
and retain the other 80% in a revolving fund. This is because a producer will prefer a higher cash 
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patronage refund only in the early years of operation. The authors compared a 20% cash 
patronage refund to a 45% cash patronage refund. They found that up to 14 years of operation, a 
farmer would receive a higher present value of after-tax cash flows from a 45% cash patronage 
refund plan. After 14 years of operation, the 20% cash patronage refund plan has a higher present 
value of after-tax cash flows. However, many cooperatives pay more than this amount. The 
authors suggested that this may be a result of negative cash flows experienced by younger 
members thanks to tax obligations under the minimum cash patronage refund.  
Beierlein and Schrader (1978) used a simulation based on average data from three 
Indiana supply and marketing cooperatives thought to represent a typical cooperative to examine 
the effect of changes in capital structure on the value of a cooperative to its member patrons. The 
cooperative was assumed to sell or purchase inputs or outputs at prices comparable to investor-
owned firms. Three policy options were included in the analysis: a limited-length revolving fund, 
alternative minimum cash patronage fund amounts, and the payment of a required return on all 
capital contributed by members. These factors are thought to impact the level of patron benefits. 
The authors found that required returns on patron equity and increased minimum cash patronage 
refunds, thought typically to be favorable to members, actually result in lower patron benefits 
under the assumed conditions. Required returns on patron equity are undesirable from the 
standpoint of total patron benefits because the increase in dividend payments was more than 
offset by a reduction in cash refunds. Increased minimum cash patronage refunds reduced overall 
patron benefits because the increased cash payments reduced the growth rate of patronage. Since 
cooperative returns exceeded farm returns, the higher growth rate of retained patronage was 
preferred to higher cash payments.  
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Corman and Fulton (1990) use a simulation approach to compare benefits to members 
under three alternative equity revolvement policies. The nonsystematic revolvement policy is 
simply an ad hoc policy. Members receive their equity investment when they exit the cooperative 
or when they die. The percentage equities redemption plan allows members to redeem a 
percentage of their equity each year. The value of equity that can be redeemed is determined by 
the year’s beginning equity. The revolving fund redeems equity after it has reached a certain age 
in the order it was retained. Results indicate that slower member growth gives higher returns for 
current members but slows asset growth. Larger cooperatives may be less profitable, reducing 
the advantage of growth. The percentage equities redemption plan is preferable to the revolving 
fund because it generates comparable growth rates to the revolving fund while providing greater 
returns to members. Additionally, gross margin significantly impacts member growth and well-
being. 
 Knoeber and Baumer (1983) use an expected utility framework to study the farmer’s 
preference for retained patronage refunds. Rates of return on cooperative and farm equity, their 
variances and covariances, and the expected future share of patronage refunds retained and its 
variance significantly impact the percentage of patronage refunds retained in the cooperative. 
Finally, the authors determine the impact of the expected rate of return on cooperative equity on 
the share of equity invested in the cooperative. As the model predicted, an increase in the 
expected rate of return was positively related with the share of equity invested in the cooperative.  
 The present work examines the effects of tax rates and farmer risk preferences on the 
cooperative board’s decision to allocate equity to specific members. We use a standard two-
period expected utility model similar to Knoeber and Baumer (1983) and sensitivity analyses to 
determine the robustness of these effects. Effective tax rates from 2006 to 2010 and empirically-
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determined farmer risk preferences from Parcell, Featherstone, and Barton (1998) are used in the 
analysis.  
 Though a significant amount of research has been conducted regarding optimal equity 
allocation, taxes have not been treated as a variable of interest. For example, Royer and Shihipar 
(1997) explicitly state that while taxes are included in their model of patron preferences,  the tax 
rate was treated as neutral to the results of the analysis and was chosen arbitrarily. The primary 
contribution of this essay is an analysis of the effect of effective tax rates on the optimal share of 
allocated earnings. 
 3.3 Theoretical Model 
As shown in Figure 3.1, which is similar to Boland (2013), the disbursal of cooperative 
earnings can be complicated. Earnings from patronage of the firm by members who are treated 
differently from income earned from non-members. All earnings, whether from members or non-
members, are then either earmarked specifically to individual members or put into a general 
equity fund. Allocated earnings are either distributed or retained in a fund, according to current 
laws and the board’s estimation of the members’ preferences. Finally, patronage earnings 
allocated to members are considered qualified earnings, meaning that the members pay taxes on 
these earnings. All other earnings are non-qualified, indicating that the cooperative pays taxes. 
 To simplify this complex decision, assumptions regarding cooperative equity are 
necessary. Boards of directors and cooperative managers are assumed to be perfect agents of the 
farmer-members with perfect knowledge of the members’ preferences as to the management of 
the assets of the cooperatives. The preferences of the members dictate the decisions of the 
managers and board members. This assumption is reasonable for two reasons. First, cooperative 
boards are made up of the members themselves. Monitoring costs are likely to be low when the 
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members serving on the board are part of the general network of producers in the area. Second, 
members likely have a high opportunity cost of investing in the cooperative. Funds invested in 
the cooperative could be used to finance projects on the members’ own operation. Since 
cooperative boards are charged with managing the cooperative’s equity, the board will likely 
align policy with members’ preferences.  
We assume that all earnings that are designated as unallocated will be reinvested in the 
cooperative as retained earnings. Therefore, this income will be categorized as non-qualified 
earnings and taxed at the cooperative level. By law, non-qualified earnings are taxed at the 
cooperative level, at least in the short term. 
Further, all remaining earnings will be allocated to the farmer and therefore taxed at the 
farmer level. All qualified earnings will be paid as 100% cash patronage refund. This allows us 
to focus on the short term impact of taxes on patronage distribution policy, and avoid the 
complexity associated with discounting future cash flows from retained patronage refunds. Still, 
the model does all for inferences of the impact of retaining patronage refunds on the optimal 
equity allocation decision.  
Using the assumptions discussed above, we employ a two-period portfolio model to 
analyze the effect of tax rates and member risk preferences on equity allocation. The after-tax 
return on member investment (𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣) is decomposed into the return on qualified earnings (𝑅𝑄𝐸 ) 
and the return on nonqualified earnings (𝑅𝑁𝑄𝐸).  The return on qualified earnings, by virtue of 
the 100% cash refund assumption, is approximated by the member’s return on assets. This is a 
reasonable proxy for the return on qualified earnings because the opportunity cost of investment 
in the cooperative is the member’s return on assets. Therefore, it is assumed that the cash 
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patronage refunds will be invested in the member’s operation if they were not invested in the 
cooperative.  
Given the return on non-qualified earnings is equal to the cooperative’s retained earnings, 
the return on cooperative assets is a reasonable proxy for return on non-qualified earnings. Thus, 
after-tax member investment can be decomposed into after-tax return on qualified earnings (the 
member’s return on the assets of their own operation) and after-tax return on non-qualified 
earnings (the return on the cooperative’s assets). 
The after-tax return on member investment can be describe as follows: 
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣 = 𝑅𝑎𝑇𝑓 + 𝑅𝑢𝑇𝑐         (1) 
where 
𝑇𝑓 = (1 − 𝑡𝑓),           (2) 
𝑇𝑐 = (1 − 𝑡𝑐),           (3) 
and 𝑡𝑓 and 𝑡𝑐 are effective farm and cooperative income tax rates, respectively. 
Since 𝑇𝑓 and 𝑇𝑐 are deterministic, we can write the expected rate of return on this portfolio as 
𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣) = 𝜔𝐸(𝑅𝑎)𝑇𝑓 + (1 − 𝜔)𝐸(𝑅𝑢)𝑇𝑐       (4) 
where 𝜔 is the initial-period share of the cooperative’s equity allocated to qualified earnings. The 
variance of 𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣) is  
𝜎𝑝
2 = 𝜔2𝑇𝑓2𝜎𝑎2 + (1 − 𝜔)2𝑇𝑐2σ𝑢22 + 2𝜔(1 − 𝜔)𝑇𝑓𝑇𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑎𝑅𝑢.    (5) 
 The board selects 𝜔 so that the utility of the next period’s equity, 𝐸1, is maximized. It is 
assumed that the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion and is specified as 
𝑣(𝐸1) = 𝐴 − 𝑒−𝜆𝐸1          (6) 
where 𝐴 is a constant that restricts the range of the function, and 𝜆, which is positive, is the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion (Pratt 1964). Since 𝐸1 is assumed to be a normally-
distributed random variable, the certainty equivalent 𝑧 is 
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𝑧 = 𝐸(𝐸1) − 𝜆2 𝜎𝐸12 .          (7) 
According to Freund (1956), maximizing 𝑧 is equivalent to maximizing expected utility. Since 
𝐸(𝐸1) is equal to 𝐸0[1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑣)], and σE12  is equal to E02σminv2 , the maximization problem is   Max
ω
z = E0[1 + E(Rminv)]- λ2 W02σRminv2  
            (8) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 0 ≤ 𝜔 ≤ 1.           
The constraint on 𝜔 ensures that there are no short sales. Using equations 4 and 5 and noting the 
restriction on 𝜔 in equation 8, the first order condition is   
∂z
∂ω
= E0�E�RQE�-E�RNQE��-λE02 �ωσRQE2 Tf2-(1-ω)σRNQE2 Tc2 + (1-2ω)CovRQERNQETfTc� = 0 
             (9) 
Solving for the optimal portfolio allocation gives 
𝜔∗ = 𝐸�𝑅𝑄𝐸� − 𝐸(𝑅𝑁𝑄𝐸)
𝜆𝐸0 �𝜎𝑅𝑄𝐸
2 𝑇𝑓
2 + 𝜎𝑅𝑁𝑄𝐸2 𝑇𝑐2 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑄𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑄𝐸𝑇𝑓𝑇𝑐��    (10) 
Finally, we find the following comparative statics: 
∂ω*
∂λ
= E02[ωσRQE2 Tf2-�1-ω�σRNQE2 Tc2+(1-2ω)CovRQERNQETfTc
∂2z
∂ω2
⋚ 0,     (11) 
∂ω*
∂Tf
= -E0E�RQE�+2TfλE02[ωσRQE2 +�1-2ω�CovRQERNQETc]
∂2z
∂ω2
⋚ 0,     (12) 
∂ω*
∂Tc
= E0E�RNQE�+2TCλE02[-(1-ω)σRNQE2 +�1-2ω�CovRQERNQETf]
∂2z
∂ω2
⋚ 0    (13) 
 Equation 11 shows the effect of risk aversion on the optimal share of qualified earnings. 
Intuitively, the sign of this derivative is dependent on the variances and covariance of the return 
on qualified and non-qualified earnings. We expect that a higher variance of returns on qualified 
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earnings will tend to make this derivative negative, while a higher variance of returns on non-
qualified earnings will tend to make it positive. A positive (negative) sign on equation 11 
indicates that more (less) risk-averse members prefer a larger (smaller) share of qualified 
earnings.  
 Equations 12 and 13 depict the effect of personal and corporate taxation on the optimal 
allocation of earnings, respectively. The signs of these derivatives are uncertain and depend on 
the expected returns and variances on qualified and non-qualified earnings, the covariance of the 
rates of return on qualified and non-qualified earnings, and the farm and cooperative income tax 
rates. These comparative statics also illustrate that the impact of one tax rate on the optimal 
allocation is affected by the other. This is because the comparative statics in equations 12 and 13 
are functions of both tax rates. A positive (negative) sign on equation 12 indicates that a lower 
(higher) effective tax rate on farm profits would increase (decrease) the optimal share of 
qualified earnings. A positive (negative) sign on equation 13 indicates that a lower (higher) 
effective tax rate on cooperative profits would increase (decrease) the optimal share of qualified 
earnings. 
Recalling the definitions given in equations 2 and 3, we expect that equation 12 will 
generally be positive and equation 13 will generally be negative. All other things equal, an 
increase in farm tax rates will likely decrease the share of net income allocated as qualified 
earnings. Conversely, an increase in cooperative income tax rates will likely increase the share of 
net income allocated as qualified earnings. Both of these effects are due to their direct effect on 
after-tax returns on member investment. Sensitivity analyses described in the next section will 
examine the relationships described in equations 11, 12, and 13. 
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 3.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
To examine the effects of member risk preferences and tax rates on the optimal share of 
qualified earnings, we use empirically-estimated farmer risk preferences and data on farm and 
cooperative income and tax rates. Empirically-estimated farmer risk preference information is 
taken from Parcell et al (1998) in the form of relative risk aversion coefficients used in that 
study. Seven tax scenarios are chosen to illustrate the effect of changes in tax policy on the 
decision to allocate profits as qualified earnings. 
Financial statement data on Kansas farms and cooperatives from 2005 to 2010 from the 
Kansas Farm Management Association and CoBank are used to estimate effective tax rates and 
rates of return on equity for farms and cooperatives, respectively. Returns and their variances can 
be found in Table 3.1 and tax rates can be found in Table 3.2.  Cooperative returns were both 
higher and less variable than the farm returns.  
The covariance between average returns in the six years of data was roughly zero. Since 
we did not have access to data that would allow a more robust calculation of the covariance, we 
selected three covariance values of -0.01, 0, and 0.01. Since cooperative assets are financed, 
ultimately, by debt or the equity farmers invest in the cooperatives, a positive covariance may be 
likely. This is because success at the farm level would drive success at the cooperative level. 
However, for some large cooperatives that are invested in other enterprises not related to 
production agriculture, it is somewhat likely that the covariance of returns between the 
cooperative and its constituent farmers would be negative.  
Support for this low to zero covariance is found in Knoeber and Baumer (1983). They 
examined the relationship between covariance of farm and cooperative returns and the share of 
earnings allocated to members. The covariance was not statistically significantly related to the 
share of patronage refunds retained by cooperatives thus was not a significant factor in 
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determining the board’s policy. This indicates that the covariance between the two returns is 
small. 
Approximations of actual returns and variances were used to generate the two scenarios 
in Table 3.3. The first scenario assumes that farm returns exceed cooperative returns.  An 
example of this would be a case where the cooperative experienced losses in capturing carry in 
the grain market or mismanaging farm supply inputs to the extent that they experienced a loss in 
profit. The second scenario assumes that cooperative returns are higher than farm returns. 
According to the data, this is the more likely scenario on average.  
To determine the effects of changes in the effective tax rates paid by farms and 
cooperatives on the optimal share of profits allocated to members, seven tax rate scenarios were 
examined. The first used actual data from the KFMA and CoBank. Deviations in the tax rates of 
5, 10, and 20 percent were calculated to create the other six scenarios. These rates were chosen to 
illustrate a range of possible changes to effective tax rates. The 5% deviations could occur as a 
result of incremental changes in the tax code while the 10% and 20% deviations represent swings 
in profitability or large purchases of fixed assets. Overall, effective farm tax rates were higher 
than cooperative tax rates.  
Results in Table 3.4 indicate that, using actual returns from KFMA and CoBank, earnings 
allocated to members should be low. This is expected since cooperative returns are both higher 
and less variable than farm returns.  
Further, the certainty equivalent is 6.9% which indicates that the farmer would be 
indifferent between a return of 6.9% with no risk and the risky return from the portfolio of 
cooperative and farm assets. The certainty equivalent gives board members an idea of what 
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return they should provide their members to ensure that members continue to invest in the 
cooperative. 
Regardless of whether the cooperative returns were higher and more variable than the 
farm returns or lower and less variable, the average optimal share of allocated earnings is 
roughly 46%. Since the tax rates (see Table 3. 2) are higher for cooperatives than for farms, this 
result is reasonable. When pre-tax cooperative returns are higher and more variable, the higher 
tax rate reduces this return and creates an incentive for a larger share of qualified earnings. When 
pre-tax farm returns are higher and more variable, the higher risk of farm returns ensures that the 
majority of earnings are retained as non-qualified earnings.  
Since the share of qualified earnings is roughly equal between the two returns scenarios, 
the certainty equivalent does not change drastically. The value of the certainty equivalent falls 
between 3.8% and 4.0% in all cases in Table 3.4. This indicates that members would be 
indifferent between riskless returns of 3.8% - 4.0% and a portfolio of cooperative and farm assets 
like those indicated in the table. Under these scenarios, cooperative boards should look to 
provide a return above this level to ensure continued investment in the cooperative. 
The tax rates used in this analysis do not have a significant impact on the share of 
qualified earnings or the certainty equivalent. Table 3.5 shows the changes in shares of qualified 
earnings and certainty equivalents due to changes in effective tax rates for farms and 
cooperatives. For each doubling of the change in tax rates, the effect on the share of qualified 
earnings and certainty equivalents roughly doubles. However, even the largest changes in tax 
rates (40%) produce changes in qualified earnings of less than 2% and changes in certainty 
equivalent of 0.1%. The results of this analysis indicate that realistic changes in effective tax 
rates will not significantly affect the share of qualified earnings. 
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 To further examine the effects of risk aversion on the optimal allocation of net income to 
members, we specify the following measure of the effect of risk aversion on 𝜔∗: 
𝛿 = |𝜔4.5∗ − 𝜔1.0∗ |          (14) 
where 𝛿 is the difference between the optimal allocation of net income as qualified earnings 
under the assumption of the highest risk aversion and the optimal allocation under the 
assumption of the most risk-neutral preferences. Higher values of 𝛿 indicate a larger impact of 
risk aversion on optimal net income allocation to qualified earnings. This value is computed for 
each tax regime. This allows us to determine the effects of risk preferences on the optimal 
allocation.  
Similar to equation 14 above, we specify the following equation to examine the effects of 
risk aversion on the certainty equivalent: 
Ω = |𝐶𝐸4.5 − 𝐶𝐸1.0|          (15) 
where Ω is the difference between the certainty equivalent under the assumption of the highest 
risk aversion and the certainty equivalent under the assumption of the most risk-neutral 
preferences. Higher values of Ω indicate a larger impact of risk aversion on optimal net income 
allocation. As above, this value is computed for each tax regime and determines the effects of 
risk preferences on the certainty equivalent.  
Table 3.6 shows values of 𝛿 and Ω
 
for each of the tax scenarios. All values in the table 
have the expected sign. The certainty equivalent is larger for the least risk averse than the most 
risk averse producers in all cases. Changes in the certainty equivalent are uniform within each 
group of assumed returns. Further, these changes are smallest in the case of actual returns and 
largest in the case of the high returns and high variance of returns for cooperatives. This 
indicates that when cooperatives are more profitable and more consistently so, risk aversion 
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among members is not as important a factor as the case of both high and highly variable returns 
for either farms or cooperatives.  
Additionally, the magnitude of the optimal share of qualified earnings was consistent 
within each group of assumed returns. This indicates that realistic changes in tax rates do not 
affect optimal qualified earnings as much as the pre-tax returns and variances of returns. 
 3.5 Conclusions 
The complexity of the distribution of earnings in agricultural cooperatives is due not only 
to the unique rules under which a cooperative operates, but also to the differential tax treatment 
of its different classes of equity and the need to consider member risk preferences when 
distributing returns between qualified and non-qualified earnings. Through simplifying 
assumptions, we developed a portfolio model of the board’s decision to either retain net income 
in the firm as non-qualified earnings (implying that the cooperative would pay taxes on these 
earnings) or to designate net income as qualified earnings (which places the tax burden on 
members). We defined cases that were composed of 5 relative risk aversion coefficients, 7 tax 
scenarios, 3 sets of means and variances of returns on allocated and unallocated equity, and 3 
possible covariances of these returns. 
The effect of risk aversion was more economically significant than the effect of taxes on 
the optimal share of qualified earnings. This implies that while boards should be conscious of the 
differential tax rates paid by members and by the cooperative firm, managing the earnings 
allocation policy in accordance with member risk preferences is likely to take precedence. 
Further, there is no evidence of an interaction effect of tax rates and risk aversion. 
A key assumption in the analysis is that 100% of qualified earnings were paid in cash. 
Thus, retaining some qualified earnings as non-qualified earnings would increase the overall 
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return to the farmer in cases where the cooperative return is higher than the farm return. Any 
funds retained in the cooperative will produce the cooperative’s rate of return.  These results are 
inconsistent with the findings of Royer and Shihipar (1997). While their analysis suggests that a 
20% cash payment is preferred to a 45% cash payment, our findings suggest that the 45% is 
optimal. 
 The above analysis is valid insofar as its assumptions are justified. Barring fundamental 
changes in laws regarding cooperatives, there are two primary issues that could change the 
results of this analysis. The assumptions regarding effective tax rates rest on the ability of 
cooperatives and farms to manage their net income in such a way as to minimize their tax 
burden. A policy change that has no effect on tax rates, such as a change in depreciation rules, 
may change the ability of firms to effectively manage net income. Of course, a change in tax 
rates could also affect the results of this analysis. Finally, a change in policy or other outside 
factors may affect the risk attitudes of farmers. For example, changes in crop insurance policy 
may change the risk profile of farms, thus impacting a farmer’s appetite for financial or 
production risk. More work is needed to determine the extent to which these and other factors are 
likely to change and the impact those changes would have on the conclusions of this analysis.  
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of Non-section 521 Cooperative Earnings 
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Table 3.1 Average Pre-Tax Returns and Variances of Returns on Assets 2006-2010 
  Mean Variance 
Farm Return on Assets 0.036 0.037 
Cooperative Return on Assets 0.085 0.007 
*Sources: Kansas Farm Management Association and CoBank 
  
 
 
Table 3.2  Effective Tax Rates Paid by Kansas Farms and Cooperatives 
  
 
Farm Coop 
Actual Effective Tax Rates* 14.1% 7.6% 
5% Increase (Decrease ) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 14.8% 7.2% 
5% Increase (Decrease ) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 13.4% 8.0% 
10% Increase (Decrease ) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 15.5% 6.8% 
10% Increase (Decrease ) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 12.7% 8.4% 
20% Increase (Decrease ) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 16.9% 6.1% 
20% Increase (Decrease ) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 11.3% 9.1% 
*Sources: Kansas Farm Management Association and CoBank 
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Table 3.3 Return and Variance of Return on Assets Used in Sensitivity Analysis 
          
 
Return on 
Qualified 
Earnings 
Return on 
Non-
Qualified 
Earnings 
Variance of 
Return on 
Qualified 
Earnings 
Variance of Return 
on Non-Qualified 
Earnings 
Higher Return and Variance on Qualified Earnings 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.01 
Higher Return and Variance on Non-Qualified Earnings 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Simulation Results: Average Share of Qualified Earnings and Certainty Equivalents 
  
 
Actual Returns 
High Farm Returns 
and Variances 
High Coop 
Returns and 
Variances 
 
w* CE† w* CE† w* CE† 
Actual Tax Rates 0.013 0.069 0.474 0.038 0.469 0.040 
5% Increase (Decrease ) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 0.013 0.069 0.468 0.038 0.465 0.040 
5% Increase (Decrease ) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.014 0.068 0.479 0.038 0.474 0.040 
10% Increase (Decrease ) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 0.012 0.069 0.462 0.038 0.461 0.040 
10% Increase (Decrease ) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.014 0.068 0.485 0.039 0.478 0.040 
20% Increase (Decrease ) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 0.011 0.070 0.449 0.037 0.454 0.040 
20% Increase (Decrease ) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.015 0.067 0.495 0.039 0.486 0.040 
*Share of qualified earnings 
† Certainty Equivalent 
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Table 3.3.5 Changes in Average Share of Qualified Earnings and Certainty Equivalents Due to Changes in Taxes 
  
 
Actual Returns High Farm Returns High Coop Returns 
 
Change 
in w* 
Change in 
CE† 
Change 
in w* 
Change in 
CE† 
Change 
in w* 
Change in 
CE† 
5% Increase (Decrease) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates -0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
5% Increase (Decrease) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 
10% Increase (Decrease) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates -0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.000 -0.008 0.000 
10% Increase (Decrease) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.000 
20% Increase (Decrease) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates -0.002 0.001 -0.022 -0.001 -0.014 0.000 
20% Increase (Decrease) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.002 -0.001 0.017 0.001 0.015 0.000 
*Share of qualified earnings 
† Certainty Equivalent 
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Table 3.6 Summary Statistics for the Effects of Risk Preferences on the Share of Qualified Earnings and the Certainty 
Equivalent 
  
 
Actual Returns 
High Farm 
Returns High Coop Returns 
 
δ* Ω† δ* Ω† δ* Ω† 
Actual Tax Rates 0.033 -0.012 -0.564 -0.025 0.612 -0.030 
5% Increase (Decrease) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 0.033 -0.011 -0.555 -0.025 0.615 -0.031 
5% Increase (Decrease) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.034 -0.012 -0.568 -0.026 0.608 -0.030 
10% Increase (Decrease) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 0.032 -0.012 -0.545 -0.024 0.619 -0.031 
10% Increase (Decrease) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.035 -0.011 -0.573 -0.026 0.605 -0.029 
20% Increase (Decrease) in Farm (Coop) Tax Rates 0.031 -0.012 -0.523 -0.023 0.619 -0.032 
20% Increase (Decrease) in Coop (Farm) Tax Rates 0.036 -0.012 -0.581 -0.027 0.598 -0.029 
*Difference between share of qualified earnings with risk aversion coefficient of 4.5 and the share of qualified earnings with risk aversion coefficient of 1. 
† Difference between certainty equivalent with risk aversion coefficient of 4.5 and the certainty equivalent with risk aversion coefficient of 1. 
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Chapter 4 - Financial Leverage and Input Misallocation in 
Agricultural Cooperatives: A DEA Approach 
 4.1 Introduction 
The unique nature of the cooperative business presents challenges to managers of 
agricultural cooperatives in terms of acquiring equity financing. Raising equity can be difficult, 
as most cooperatives do not allow non-member investors, unlike their for-profit counterparts. 
Typically, cooperatives obtain equity through mergers (Richards and Manfredo, 2001) or 
through retained earnings due primarily to profitability (Kenkel et al, 2003). As a result of the 
limited ability to obtain equity, debt is an important tool for financing the operation and 
expansion of a cooperative.   
 Since 1979, the cooperative industry has seen some drastic changes in scale and 
profitability, while leverage has remained relatively stable. Figure 4.1 shows the decline in the 
number of agricultural cooperatives in the U.S. from nearly 6,500 in 1979 to just over 2,300 in 
2010. Average net income for cooperatives remained generally below $500,000 (all values are in 
constant 1982 dollars) from 1979 to 2003. From 2003 to 2010, average cooperative income has 
risen rapidly from just over $330,000 to over $2 million. As shown in Figure 4.2, leverage 
(measured by the ratio of debt to assets) was fairly constant around 0.6. Average cooperative 
assets rose steadily from over $1.7 million in 1979 to $18.4 million in 2006. Since 2006, the 
average value of cooperative assets has risen to $31.2 million. 
Some negative effects of the use of leverage in cooperatives are noted in the literature. 
Leverage can have a negative impact on ROE (Boyd et al, 2007) and was responsible for a 
significant portion of financial stress in cooperatives in the 1990s (Moller et al, 1996). Recently, 
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there is evidence that debt improves financial performance (McKee, 2008). Parcell et al (1998) 
offers an explanation for a positive/negative relationship between higher percentages of debt 
financing and higher returns. That is, if the return on assets is less (more) than the cost of debt, 
the use of leverage negatively (positively) affects the rate of return on equity. 
 Another important impact of leverage is the potential for agency costs. Agency costs 
associated with leverage can result from losses due to incomplete contracts between borrowers 
and creditors, as well as monitoring and disposal costs borne by the creditor. Creditors charge 
higher interest rates for those firms that present greater default risks. This increased rate 
compensates the creditor for the additional default risk it has taken. Agency costs may also cause 
firms to use assets or inputs that would be sub-optimal to provide collateral for the debt 
contracts. 
An important problem for cooperatives is the optimal use of fixed assets or capacity. 
Ariyaratne et al. (2006) attempts to determine productivity and assess factors affecting 
productivity growth using nonparametric and parametric methods. Additionally, input and output 
biases were calculated by comparing changes in technical change over time. Malmquist 
productivity indices were used to determine technical change and changes in efficiency. A 
regression model was used to decompose the effects of productivity into price and input and 
output bias effects. Between 1992 and 1998, productivity in grain marketing and supply 
cooperatives in Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and 
Texas improved by 6.1%. The authors found that this increase was due to technological 
improvements rather than pure efficiency or scale change effects and that significant input and 
output bias existed. The authors suggested that cooperatives could improve performance by more 
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efficiently using inputs and by operating at optimal capacity. Additionally, the inclusion of 
fertilizer, grain, and chemicals in the firm’s product mix would result in increased productivity. 
 Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995) found evidence of agency costs in a sample of 29 
farm supply and marketing cooperatives from 1979 to 1988. They found that the use of leverage 
increased variable costs and resulted in a decrease in the use of labor inputs suggesting that 
agency costs exist in farm supply and marketing cooperatives. Additionally, the authors 
examined the effect of debt financing on changes in total factor productivity and found that debt 
had an overall positive effect on total factor productivity growth. 
 The objective of this study is to determine whether and to what extent agency costs exist 
in farm supply and marketing cooperatives using information on cooperative financial statements 
from 2005 to 2010. A more complete understanding of the indirect costs of leverage will add to 
the understanding of cooperative financial structure. An understanding of the indirect costs of 
leverage is necessary to examine the tradeoffs associated with the use of leverage. The analysis is 
conducted in two stages: a nonparametric estimation of variable cost efficiency as well as 
optimal input quantities and a regression of variable cost efficiency on debt and outputs. This 
two-stage process provides results comparable to Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995).   
This work adds to the literature by using a nonparametric estimation of the variable cost 
function. One advantage of nonparametric estimation is that the curvature of the cost function 
conforms to economic theory. In addition, recent work by Parman et al (2013) demonstrates the 
relative superiority of this method in obtaining estimates of economic measures. 
 4.2 Theory and Methods 
Following Kim and Maksimovic (1990), a two-period variable cost model to determine 
two effects of the use of leverage: differences in capacity between an all-equity firm and a firm 
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that uses debt, and effects on future input use generated by current input use. In the first period, 
debt and capacity are determined. In the second period, variable inputs are determined. Agency 
costs are said to exist if the derivative of variable costs with respect to debt is positive. A 
nonparametric variable cost function is estimated and the effect of debt is examined in an 
auxiliary regression, consistent with Coelli et al (2005).  
 In the present work, the variable cost function is defined as: 
  𝑉𝐶 = 𝐶𝑣(𝑤, 𝑥, 𝑐,𝑑,𝑌)        (1) 
where 𝑣 indicates that the function is estimated under variable returns to scale, 𝑤 is a vector of 
two input prices, 𝑥 is a vector of two input quantities, 𝑐 is fixed capacity, 𝑑 is debt, and 𝑌 is a 
vector of three outputs. As in Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995), we assume that capacity and 
debt are set in the first period and the quantities of the two variable inputs are chosen in the 
second period.  
To estimate the variable cost function, data envelopment analysis is used to estimate the 
minimum variable cost of the cooperative firm under variable returns to scale. The model, 
developed by Färe et al (1985) is as follows: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛  𝑤𝑖′𝑥𝑖∗ = 𝐶𝑣(𝑤, 𝑥, 𝑐,𝑌)        (2) 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜  𝑧𝑖 𝑥𝑖  ≤ 𝑥𝑘∗        (3) 
𝑧𝑖𝑐𝑖  ≤ 𝑐𝑘       (4) 
𝑧𝑖𝑑𝑖  ≤ 𝑑𝑘       (5) 
   𝑧𝑖 𝑌𝑖 ≥ 𝑌𝑘       (6) 
   ∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑖 =  1       (7) 
where 𝑤 is a vector of input prices, 𝑥∗ is a vector of cost-minimizing inputs for cooperative 𝑖, 𝑥 
is a vector of actual variable inputs, 𝑧 measures the weighting of each firm in forming the 
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frontier, 𝑐 is fixed capacity, 𝑑 is debt and 𝑦 is a vector of outputs.  Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the variables 𝑤, 𝑥, 𝑐, 𝑑, and 𝑌 are strictly positive and 𝑧 is greater than or equal to zero. 
 The theoretical minimum variable cost calculated above is used to calculate the variable 
cost efficiency score of each cooperative. Taken together, these scores establish the best-practice 
(i.e. lowest variable cost for a given level of output) frontier and the relationship of each 
observation to that frontier. Based on the search for relevant literature, this manuscript represents 
the first calculation of cost efficiency for cooperatives. The variable cost efficiency is defined as: 
𝐶𝐸𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖′𝑥𝑖∗/𝑤𝑖′𝑥𝑖         (8) 
where 𝐶𝐸 is the variable cost efficiency score and the other variables are defined above 𝐶𝐸 ∈[0,1].  A firm is considered efficient if the cost efficiency score is equal to one.  That is, if a 
cooperative’s actual variable cost is equal to the theoretical minimum variable cost as defined in 
equation (1), the firm is on the frontier.  
 Agency costs to the firm from the use of leverage are present if a decline in variable cost 
efficiency coincides with an increase in debt. While the direct cost of debt is the interest the 
cooperative pays to the lender, indirect costs (agency costs) may drive up variable costs. Thus, 
determining the relationship between the level of debt a firm uses and the variable cost efficiency 
of the cooperative provides evidence as to the presence of agency costs of debt. 
In addition to determining the overall effect of debt on the firm, we estimate the impact 
of agency costs on two subsets of variable cost. To determine whether a firm was over- or under-
using in a given variable input, the ratio of the optimal input under variable returns to scale to the 
actual input quantity is calculated. These ratios are defined as follows: 
𝑅𝐿 = 𝑥𝐿∗𝑥𝐿          (9) 
𝑅𝑂 = 𝑥𝑂∗𝑥𝑂          (10) 
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where 𝑥𝐿∗ and 𝑥𝑂∗  are the optimal quantities of labor and other variable inputs, respectively and 𝑥𝐿 
and 𝑥𝑂 are actual quantities of labor and other variable inputs, respectively.  
These values are compared across different values of debt to determine whether different 
debt levels are associated with shifts in the allocation of inputs. If optimal input ratios move 
away from 1 as the level of debt changes, there is evidence that agency costs are present. A ratio 
greater than 1 indicates that the cooperative is likely under-using an input, while a ratio less than 
1 indicates likely over-use of an input. A ratio equal to 1 indicates that the cooperative is 
probably using the optimal amount of an input. 
 In the second stage, the cost efficiency scores calculated (equation 8) are used to estimate 
relationships between the previously-mentioned covariates. A Tobit model is used to account for 
the upper and lower bounds on the cost efficiency scores. This regression estimates the 
relationships between debt, capacity, output, and cost efficiency. It is specified as follows: 
𝐶𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝐶𝐶 +  𝛽𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝑘𝜋𝑘 + 𝛽𝑗𝛾𝑗                      (11) 
where 𝐶𝐸 is defined as above, 𝐷 is total debt, 𝐶 is capacity, 𝑆 is a vector of two output shares, 𝜋 
is a vector of 5 time dummies, and 𝛾𝑗 is a vector of 8 state dummies.  
 From these regressions, we are able to determine whether agency costs exist in 
agricultural cooperatives. Kim and Maksimovic (1990) define the marginal effect of debt on 
variable cost as an indication of the presence of agency costs. For our purposes, agency costs 
associated with debt exist when 𝛽𝐷 is statistically significant and negative. In order to determine 
the elasticity values, conditional marginal effects are used. Elasticities are defined as follows: 
𝜀𝐷 ≡
𝜕𝐸[𝐶𝐸|1>𝐶𝐸>0]
𝜕𝑖
𝐸[𝑖]
𝐸[𝐶𝐸|1>𝐶𝐸>0]        (12) 
where 𝜀𝑖 is the conditional elasticity of variable cost efficiency with respect to 𝑖.  
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 4.3 Data 
Cost efficiency scores were estimated using financial statement data for farm supply and 
marketing cooperatives from 2005 to 2010 in 9 states: Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Oklahoma. The data are obtained from CoBank and 
include balance sheet, income statement, and statement of owner’s equity. Table 4.1 presents 
summary statistics for all variables described below. 
Similar to Tonsor and Featherstone (2009) and Rowland et al. (1998), overall cost 
efficiency is estimated using a data envelopment analysis. Two inputs and three outputs are used 
in the calculation of minimum variable cost. Variable cost is defined as net sales less net income, 
depreciation, amortization, and lease expense. Labor cost is defined as payroll expense. Other 
variable cost is defined as variable costs less payroll expense. Debt is defined as the value of 
total liabilities. The prices of each input are the state-level manufacturing payroll wage and the 
GDP deflator, respectively. Wage data was taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Employment and Earnings report and the GDP deflator was taken from the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve FRED® Economic Data database. Input quantities are determined by dividing both costs 
by their respective price or price index.  
Output variables are defined as marketing revenue, farm supply revenue, and other 
revenue divided by their respective price indices. The marketing price index is composed of 
yearly average commodity prices for corn, wheat, soybeans, sorghum, and rice taken from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and is weighted by the state-level production of each commodity. 
State-level production data were taken from USDA-NASS. The farm supply price index is the 
average of fertilizer, agricultural chemical, gasoline, and animal feed prices taken from the 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics. The price index for other revenue is the producer price index for all 
commodities taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 4.4 Results 
The results of the cost efficiency estimation can be found in Table 4.2. Of the 1,975 
observations in this analysis, 73 observations defined the frontier. The mean efficiency of 0.73 
and median of 0.74 indicate that the distribution is not highly skewed. The mean efficiency also 
indicates that the average cooperative could reduce its costs 27% while maintaining current 
production and input mix to move to the frontier. Further, the minimum cost efficiency of 0.26 
indicates that the least efficient firm would need to reduce its costs by 74% while maintaining 
current production and input mix to move to the frontier. 
A variable cost efficiency frontier is estimated and a regression analysis is conducted to 
determine whether agency costs are present in agricultural cooperatives. An examination of the 
variable cost efficiency frontier is provided in section 4.4.1. Results of the efficiency thirds 
analysis (4.4.2) and regression analysis (4.4.3) can be found below. We find mixed results with 
respect to the existence of agency costs in cooperatives. 
 4.4.1 Variable Cost Efficiency Frontier 
The cooperatives that comprise the frontier exhibit interesting characteristics. Nearly all 
variables in Table 4.3 exhibit a right-skewed distribution. This indicates that the majority of the 
cooperatives that make up the frontier are smaller in terms of sales, assets, equity, debt, and 
output than the average. Additionally, nearly all variables have a standard deviation larger than 
the average, indicating a high degree of variability among the cooperatives that form the frontier.  
The average cooperative on the frontier finances a large amount of its assets with debt. 
The average leverage for cooperatives on the frontier is 59%. This measure is left-skewed, 
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indicating that a majority of the cooperatives finance more than 59% of their assets with debt. 
Although most measures are highly variable, the standard deviation of leverage is only 15.7% 
indicating that cooperatives on the frontier have leverage values relatively close to 59%.  
Though the most efficient cooperatives finance a large portion of their assets with debt, 
this does not indicate that agency costs are not present. The most efficient cooperatives are likely 
to perform well (indicated by high ROE and ROA values) and will likely attract favorable credit 
terms based on their ability to generate a high return from operations. Thus, more analysis is 
needed to determine the overall effects of leverage on cooperatives.  
 4.4.2 Debt and Capacity Model Thirds 
In order to determine the effects of debt, fixed capacity, and other financial variables on 
variable cost efficiency, the data was divided into three groups: low efficiency, middle 
efficiency, and high efficiency. Full results can be found in Table 4.4.  
 These results indicate that more efficient cooperatives are larger according to several 
measures. More efficient cooperatives were larger in terms of both assets and sales, used more 
debt and capacity, used more of both inputs and produced more of all three outputs. Though both 
labor and other variable input ratios converged toward 1 on average as cost efficiency increased, 
the labor input was under-used and the other variable inputs were over-used on average. Further, 
this analysis does not indicate the presence of agency costs since increases in debt are associated 
with higher variable cost efficiency.   
 An interesting finding is that both ROA and ROE decreased as cost efficiency increased. 
This result indicates that although less cost efficient firms were smaller and had lower sales, 
these smaller firms were able to obtain high enough sales so as to obtain higher return on assets 
and equity relative to their larger and more cost efficient counterparts. 
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 To determine the effect of capacity on cost efficiency and optimal input usage, the data 
were divided into low, middle, and high capacity groups (Table 4.5). Variable cost efficiency 
increases as capacity increases, indicating that cooperatives are likely using their capacity to 
effectively increase profitability. This is not consistent with the findings of Featherstone and Al-
Kheraiji (1995). They found that cooperatives were overusing capacity and that this overuse was 
due to suboptimal output allocations. Both sales and ROA increase as capacity increases further 
confirming that profitability is increased by increasing capacity. These findings suggest that 
increases in net investment in cooperative assets (Boland 2013) are justified on the basis of 
profitability. 
 Other variable cost ratio converged to 1 as variable cost efficiency increased indicating 
that increases in capacity improved cooperatives’ ability to optimally allocate inputs. The labor 
input ratio converged to 1 from the low to middle capacity groups but diverged farther from 1 
between the middle and high capacity groups. This finding is somewhat consistent with that of 
other variable inputs, but indicates that medium capacity cooperatives may have problems with 
under-utilization of labor as they increase capacity.  
 Finally, the data was divided into low, medium, and high debt groups in order to 
determine the presence of agency costs of debt on cooperatives (Table 4.6). As debt increased, 
variable cost efficiency decreased from the low to middle efficiency groups but increased from 
the middle to high efficiency groups. This may indicate the presence of agency costs in smaller 
cooperatives but increased debt could also be used to cover for poor management. Regression 
analysis is needed to control for other factors and determine the relationship between variable 
costs and debt. Though sales increased, the value of assets also increased and ROA decreased, 
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indicating that if they are present, these agency costs of leverage may have a significant effect on 
cooperative profitability.  
 Overall, labor was underutilized and the optimal labor input ratio converged to1 as 
leverage increased. This finding is not consistent with the presence of agency costs. Other 
variable inputs were over-utilized and converged to optimal as debt increased. Again, this does 
not indicate the presence of agency costs, but regression analysis is necessary to control for the 
covariance of explanatory variables. 
 4.4.3 Regression Analysis 
A Tobit regression analysis was conducted to determine the effects of various financial 
and production variables on variable cost efficiency. The regression analysis adds to the analysis 
of cost efficiency, leverage, and capacity thirds by accounting for the covariance between the 
variables. A Tobit model was chosen because variable cost efficiency is bounded between 0 and 
1. Unlike the OLS model, the Tobit model restricts predictions within that range. The regression 
results can be found in Table 4.7 and the associated elasticities of interest in Table 4.8. 
 The elasticities in Table 4.8 indicate that agency costs and negative effects of the overuse 
of capacity are evident. Though the thirds analysis above indicates that increases in capacity are 
associated with increases in efficiency, the regression analysis (which controls for the effects of 
other variables) indicates the opposite. Regression analysis confirms the existence of agency 
costs indicated the above section. Ratios of marketing and farm supply outputs to other outputs 
were significantly positively related to cost efficiency, indicating that cooperatives heavily 
invested in these enterprises are more cost efficient. 
 The effect of debt on cost efficiency is statistically significant and negative but inelastic. 
For a 1% increase in debt, there is a corresponding 0.132% decrease in cost efficiency. This 
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finding indicates that financing assets with debt can have a negative impact on cost efficiency, 
though the effect is not large. 
  Overuse of capacity is an issue that may be driven by high profits. As cooperatives 
increase profitability, their ability to purchase high-value fixed assets increases. This increased 
incentive to purchase fixed assets, coupled with an increase in the value of other fixed assets 
(e.g. land) drives up the value of capacity. However, paying higher prices for fixed assets can, as 
the results indicate, drive up costs relative to output.  
 4.5 Conclusions 
 This study determines examines the degree to which agency costs exist in a sample of 
farm supply and marketing cooperatives from 2005 to 2010. Evidence of agency costs was 
defined as a decrease in cost efficiency or a divergence of input usage from optimal that 
coincided with an increase in debt financing. Agency costs can come in the form of disposal 
costs, monitoring costs, or other costs associated with default risk that the lender passes on to the 
borrower in the form of covenants and higher interest rates. Our results are consistent with the 
findings of Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995) regarding the existence of agency costs in the 
cooperative industry in the 1980s. 
Though the analysis of means was not consistent with the regression results, regression is 
a more powerful tool for summarizing economic relationships as it controls for covariance 
between regressors. Over the 2005-2010 period, agricultural cooperatives experienced some 
degree of agency costs, though the elasticities indicate that the effect of debt is not large.  
Because of the current low-interest rate environment, agency costs are likely not any 
more prevalent now than they were in the 2005-2010 period. If interest rates begin to climb, this 
effect may become more prevalent and may cause some firms to default. Cooperative boards 
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should be conscious of the effect of agency costs and the interplay between the existence of those 
costs and government policy. 
More work is needed to disaggregate the net effect of leverage on variable cost efficiency 
in order to determine the effects of covenants, interest rates, and scale effects. In addition, future 
work should examine the relationship between the level and variability of interest rates and 
agency costs. 
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Figure 4.1 Number of Agricultural Cooperatives and Average Net Income Per Cooperative. 
(USDA) 
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Figure 4.2 Average Cooperative Leverage and Average Cooperative Assets. (USDA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Co
ns
ta
nt
 2
00
5 
Do
lla
rs
 (B
ill
io
ns
) 
Le
ve
ra
ge
 
Leverage (left
axist)
Assets (right
axis)
 72 
 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of CoBank Data 
  
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Labor Input 189,132 90,071 250,732 
Other Variable Input 627,940 294,780 859,935 
Capacity 30,470,635 5,150,227 72,174,851 
Debt $19,357,355 $8,036,907 $30,416,544 
Marketing Output 321,200 142,732 490,204 
Farm Supply Output 120,171 55,067 175,240 
Other Output 81,703 14,344 335,860 
Wage $17.20 $16.88 $1.35 
GDP Deflator 106.48 108.59 3.79 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Distribution of Cost Efficiency Scores 
  
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Firms on 
Frontier 
Cost Efficiency 0.733 0.747 0.151 0.269 1 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
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Table 4.3 Financial Information for Midwestern Agricultural Cooperatives with Variable 
Cost Efficiency Scores of 1 (n = 73) 
  
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Labor Input 608,335 429,654 593,068 
Other Variable Input 1,670,719 959,481 2,012,858 
Labor Input Ratio 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Other Variable Input Ratio 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Sales $269,872,811  $135,000,000  $335,271,960  
Marketing Output 773,786 171,154 1,156,207 
Farm Supply Output 258,760 33,276 366,078 
Other Output 677,069 100,924 1,281,932 
Total Assets $97,536,501  $70,972,871  $101,170,733  
Debt $65,842,557  $45,555,965  $73,933,265  
Equity $31,693,945  $23,347,317  $30,506,907  
Capacity 112,181,145 21,400,000 200,462,295 
ROE 0.251 0.201 0.347 
ROA 0.075 0.054 0.13 
Leverage 0.590 0.620 0.157 
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Table 4.4 Financial Information for Midwestern Agricultural Cooperatives Divided Into 
Low, Middle, and High Variable Cost Efficiency Groups* 
        
 
Low Middle High 
Cost Efficiency 0.562 0.744 0.897 
Labor Input 103,682 168,729 296,429 
Other Variable Input 464,102 598,318 824,784 
Labor Input Ratio 1.194 1.163 1.110 
Other Variable Input Ratio 0.543 0.729 0.891 
Sales $55,457,878 $74,222,603 $114,898,846 
Marketing Output 228,408 308,941 428,266 
Farm Supply Output 60,078 118,132 183,421 
Other Output 20,619 41,326 183,849 
Total Assets $19,708,933 $27,180,839 $44,126,034 
Debt $13,013,151 $17,419,006 $27,732,719 
Equity $6,695,781 $9,761,833 $16,393,315 
Capacity 11,737,958 31,959,732 48,074,130 
ROE 0.232 0.218 0.199 
ROA 0.064 0.063 0.062 
Leverage 0.580 0.537 0.539 
*All values are means. 
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Table 4.5 Financial Information for Midwestern Agricultural Cooperatives Divided Into 
Low, Middle, and High Capacity Groups* 
  
 
Low Middle High 
Cost Efficiency 0.721 0.726 0.753 
Labor Input 55,916 202,012 311,892 
Other Variable Input 180,163 630,693 1,080,490 
Labor Input Ratio 1.108 1.035 1.324 
Other Variable Input Ratio 0.710 0.717 0.733 
Sales $22,457,448 $78,265,298 $144,320,310 
Marketing Output 105,571 346,037 515,973 
Farm Supply Output 37,668 139,687 184,833 
Other Output 20,319 65,425 160,143 
Total Assets $8,414,982 $31,559,891 $51,268,218 
Debt $5,065,911 $20,523,636 $32,739,158 
Equity $3,349,071 $11,036,255 $18,529,060 
Capacity 1,216,637 6,053,046 84,260,182 
ROE 0.213 0.212 0.224 
ROA 0.054 0.056 0.080 
Leverage 0.508 0.591 0.560 
*All values are means. 
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Table 4.6 Financial Information for Midwestern Agricultural Cooperatives Divided Into 
Low, Middle, and High Debt Groups* 
  
 
Low Middle High 
Cost Efficiency 0.717 0.706 0.777 
Labor Input             44,973            107,739              415,652  
Other Variable Input          130,170           353,626           1,402,875  
Labor Input Ratio 1.227 1.129 1.107 
Other Variable Input Ratio 0.698 0.693 0.768 
Sales    $16,541,878     $44,268,974     $183,527,660  
Marketing Output             72,678            196,113              696,025  
Farm Supply Output             28,783              70,421              261,401  
Other Output             15,055              35,030              195,089  
Total Assets      $5,260,043     $15,086,255       $70,612,936  
Debt      $2,147,678       $8,657,857       $47,334,052  
Equity      $3,112,365       $6,428,398       $23,278,883  
Capacity        7,263,088       16,798,105         67,378,778  
ROE 0.148 0.216 0.285 
ROA 0.070 0.064 0.056 
Leverage 0.408 0.590 0.660 
*All values are means. 
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Table 4.7 Tobit Regression Results* 
 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t P-Value 
Debt 0.002 0.000 24.920 0.000 
Capacity 0.003 0.000 7.140 0.000 
Marketing Output Share -0.250 0.011 -22.840 0.000 
Farm Supply Output Share -0.093 0.013 -6.940 0.000 
Iowa 0.045 0.009 5.102 0.000 
Illinois  0.088 0.009 10.100 0.000 
Indiana 0.078 0.013 6.240 0.000 
Kansas 0.036 0.008 4.250 0.000 
Minnsota 0.036 0.009 4.160 0.000 
Missouri 0.004 0.011 0.390 0.698 
Nebraska 0.055 0.010 5.470 0.000 
Ohio 0.043 0.010 4.190 0.000 
2005 0.174 0.007 25.850 0.000 
2006 0.102 0.007 15.120 0.000 
2007 -0.046 0.007 -6.760 0.000 
2008 -0.019 0.007 -27.260 0.000 
2009 -0.009 0.006 -1.490 0.136 
Constant 0.810 0.013 60.310 0.000 
*Dependent variable is the variable cost efficiency score. 
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Table 4.8 Conditional Elasticities with Respect to Variable Cost Efficiency 
 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error z P-Value 
Debt -0.132 0.012 -10.680 0.000 
Capacity -0.046 0.010 -4.620 0.000 
Marketing Output Share 0.084 0.006 13.230 0.000 
Farm Supply Output Share 0.032 0.004 7.080 0.000 
Iowa -0.009 0.002 -4.490 0.000 
Illinois  -0.019 0.003 -6.790 0.000 
Indiana -0.025 0.005 -4.770 0.000 
Kansas -0.002 0.000 -3.400 0.001 
Minnsota -0.004 0.001 -3.490 0.000 
Missouri 0.000 0.000 -0.370 0.711 
Nebraska -0.005 0.001 -3.900 0.000 
Ohio -0.003 0.001 -3.190 0.000 
2005 -0.079 0.007 -10.860 0.000 
2006 -0.018 0.002 -7.770 0.000 
2007 0.001 0.000 5.920 0.000 
2008 0.008 0.001 6.970 0.000 
2009 0.001 0.001 1.570 0.117 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
This dissertation is composed of three essays  which addressed three questions 
surrounding the present high-profit state of commercial agriculture. The purpose of the 
dissertation was to analyze the following questions related to effective capital management of 
farms and cooperatives: 1) Should farmers use a different benchmark for farm profitability?, 2) 
How should cooperatives allocate earnings to farmers?, and 3) Do cooperatives face agency 
costs? Thus, this dissertation had three objectives. The first was to examine the effect of short- 
and long-term debt financing on the cost efficiency of Kansas farms. The second was to examine 
the effect of tax rates and member risk preferences on the cooperative’s decision to retain profits 
in the firm or return them to members. The third was to determine the extent of indirect costs of 
the use of leverage in agricultural cooperatives. 
To answer the first question, essay 1, “The Impact of Liquidity and Solvency on Cost 
Efficiency” developed a conceptual framework for examining the effect of liquidity and solvency 
on cost efficiency and used data from the Kansas Farm Management Association to estimate cost 
efficiency for a sample of Kansas farms.  
Adding liquidity and solvency ratios to the DEA analysis increased efficiency scores by 
shifting the cost efficiency frontier up, especially for low efficiency farms.  Less efficient farms, 
as defined by the lowest quartile cost efficiency estimates, saw significant improvements in their 
efficiency scores when financial ratios were added.  Thus, an analyst may be missing an 
important part of a given farm’s efficiency picture unless debt measures are included in the cost 
efficiency estimation.    
 Furthermore, adding liquidity and solvency ratios to the cost efficiency estimation 
improved efficiency values for farms with different input mixes.  When adding financial ratios to 
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cost share analysis, farms with lower crop and fuel input levels and a higher capital input level 
had a higher efficiency gain than the average farm when liquidity and solvency ratios were 
added.  
 Although income shares were not significantly related to improvements in cost 
efficiency, we found a significant and positive relationship between specialization and 
improvements in efficiency.  This indicates that while enterprise choice does not impact cost 
efficiency when debt ratios are added to the model, the choice of the number of enterprises to 
operate does.  There is also evidence that the age of operator is significantly related to 
improvement in efficiency.  Results suggest that the efficiency indices for older operators are 
impacted to a greater extent by the addition of debt ratios than those for younger operators. 
Further, we have demonstrated that the impact of an inclusion of financial ratios in the cost 
efficiency estimation varies according to the particular distribution of cost shares and other farm 
characteristics. 
To answer the second question, essay 2, “Cooperative Equity Allocation: A Portfolio 
Approach” used effective tax rates and empirically-determined risk aversion coefficients in an 
expected utility model to determine the optimal share of net income to allocate to members. The 
effects of seven tax regimes and five risk aversion levels on the optimal allocation of net income 
to cooperative members were analyzed using a sensitivity analysis. Results indicated that 
changes in tax rates had a small impact on optimal share of allocated earnings. Increased risk 
aversion had the expected effect on allocated earnings. That is, higher levels of risk aversion 
resulted in higher (lower) optimal share of net income allocated to members when variance of 
return on allocated equity was relatively low (high).  
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 Our findings indicated that cooperative boards should be conscious of the risk attitudes of 
their members as their preferences affect the optimal share of net income allocated to members. 
The effects of risk aversion on the optimal share of allocated equity and the minimum return 
farmers expect from their cooperative investment far outweighed the effects of any reasonable 
change in tax rate in the future. 
To answer the third question, essay 3, “Financial Leverage and Input Misallocation: A 
DEA Approach” used data from CoBank to estimate variable cost efficiency. A two-stage model 
was used that included a math programming model to estimate variable cost efficiency and a 
Tobit regression of cost efficiency scores on debt, capacity, and other variables.  
Results of this estimation were examined for evidence of agency costs. Evidence of 
agency costs came in the form of decreased cost efficiency or a divergence of input usage from 
optimal while leverage increased. We find evidence of agency costs of debt in agricultural 
cooperatives from 2005 to 2010. Agency costs can come in the form of disposal costs, 
monitoring costs, or other costs associated with default risk that the lender passes on to the 
borrower in the form of covenants and higher interest rates.  
 This dissertation examined three questions related to the capital structure of farms and 
agricultural cooperatives. Cost structure and other firm characteristics were significantly affected 
by leverage in Kansas farms and Midwestern cooperatives. Risk preferences and agency costs 
significantly impacted debt and equity management for cooperatives. Future work in these areas 
will continue to be relevant as the agricultural industry faces challenges and changes such as an 
increasing world population, changes in federal agricultural policy, and improvements in 
technology.  
